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ABSTRACT
The objective of this research is to examine the obsta-
cles which are preventing the Navy from realizing the full
economic advantage of a total cost management program for
aviation support equipment. The research has shown that
Navy program managers are not fully committed to managing
life-cycle cost nor is it considered early enough in the
procurement process to influence design. To improve the
life-cycle cost management effort, existing policies and
provisions included in DoD Directives should be applied to
aviation support equipment. More emphasis should be placed
on the RFP as a means of communicating the Navy's concerns
about controlling cost and adequate information should be
provided to the contractor to be used in developing realis-
tic cost estimates. Finally, life-cycle cost should be
elevated to the level of unit-production cost, schedule and
performance and made a mandatory source selection criterion,
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FOCUS OF THIS STUDY
To field a weapon system in today's environment is an
expensive proposition to say the least. Prices are increas-
ing and the acquisition process is coming under increased
scrutiny by Congress. In such an atmosphere, the Navy needs
to seek more efficient methods of acquiring and operating
the weapon systems needed to fulfill the foreign policy ob-
jectives of the United States. One method of accomplishing
this is by seeking better ways of managing and controlling
the life-cycle cost of systems and subsystems.
B. OBJECTIVE
The intent of this thesis is to examine the obstacles
which are preventing the Navy from deriving the full econom-
ic advantage of managing life-cycle costs for aviation sup-
port equipment. It is directed towards management level
personnel, (program managers and contracting officers), and
is not intended to be a detailed discussion of the proce-
dures used to accumulate life-cycle cost data or of the
analytical techniques used in evaluating these data. Empha-
sis is placed on management's approach to controlling life-
cycle costs and is limited to the acquisition of aviation
systems and, in particular, aviation support equipment.
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In consonance with the above stated objective the follow-
ing research question was addressed: What are the obstacles
which are preventing the Navy from minimizing life-cycle
costs in the acquisition of aviation support equipment?
In support of the primary research question the follow-
ing secondary questions were addressed:
* What are life-cycle costs and how have they been
controlled?
* What legislation or regulations have been proposed or
are anticipated concerning life-cycle cost and what
effect might these laws and regulations have in mini-
mizing life-cycle costs?
* What is industries perception of the obstacles which
might be overcome in order to minimize life-cycle
costs?
* What internal action can the Navy take to overcome
these obstacles?
* How can industry be encouraged or incentivized to
minimize life-cycle cost?
* What has the Navy done to minimize life-cycle cost?
* What specific actions could the Navy take to reduce
life-cycle costs for aviation support equipment?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary methods of research to support this study
have been an in-depth literature search, and personal and
telephone interviews with industry and Navy representatives.
Personal interviews were conducted with representatives of
Lockheed, Teledyne and Litton Guidance and Control Systems.
On the Navy side, personal interviews were conducted with
personnel at the Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters and
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the Naval Air Logistics Center, Pautuxent River, Maryland.
Numerous telephone interviews were also conducted with Navy
representatives at NAVAIR.
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The management of ownership costs for support equipment
is addressed from two directions. Since support equipment
is a significant portion of the operating and support costs
of a major system, emphasis is first placed on controlling
life-cycle cost at the system level. Secondly, recognizing
that support equipment has a life-cycle of its own, the
management of the ownership costs of the support equipment
itself will be addressed.
The thesis specifically examines the obstacles to manag-
ing life-cycle cost as viewed by support equipment contrac-
tors in the aerospace industry and by Navy and civilian
officials of the Department of Defense. This thesis will
also offer recommendations to increase the effectiveness of
life-cycle cost management in the acquisition of aviation
systems and support equipment.
F. LIMITATIONS
No limitations were encountered while conducting this
research.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout this research report, it is assumed that the
reader is familiar with the Federal Acquisition process and
12
has a general understanding of life-cycle cost. It is fur-
ther assumed that the reader is familiar with basic Naval
terminology and with basic contracting and acquisition
terminology.
H. DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of this thesis, the term life-cycle
cost (LCC) will be used synonymously with ownership costs,
total cost of ownership and unless otherwise specified
"cost" will refer to LCC vice unit-production cost (UPC).
Life-cycle cost is defined as:
The sum total of the direct, indirect, recurring, non-re-
curring, and other related costs incurred, or estimated
to be incurred in the design, research and development
(R&D), investment, operation, maintenance, and support
of a product over its life cycle, i.e., its anticipated
useful life span. It is the total cost of the R&D,
investment, O&S and, where applicable, disposal phases
of the life cycle. All relevant costs should be in-
cluded regardless of funding source or management
control. [Ref. l:p. 5]
I. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into an introduction, two back-
ground chapters, a chapter detailing the regulatory frame-
work for managing cost, three chapters discussing the problem
and solutions as perceived by industry and Government repre-
sentatives and a final chapter of conclusions and recommen-
dations. Chapters II and III define what is meant by
life-cycle cost management and some of the methods of con-
trolling costs which have been employed in the past. Chap-
ter IV discusses the Directives which outline the policies
13
and procedures to be followed in managing life-cycle cost.
Chapter V relates the obstacles to managing ownership costs
as perceived by representatives of the aerospace industry
and Chapter VI is a discussion of possible solutions. Chap-
ter VII addresses the problem from the point of view of the
Navy. Chapter VIII presents the conclusions and recommenda-
tions of this study.
Each chapter is structured to answer one or more of the
research questions with the answer being stated in the chap-
ter summary. A separate summary of answers to research
questions is therefore not provided.
The appendix is a list of acronyms used throughout the
text.
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II. LIFE-CYCLE COST MANAGEMENT
This chapter provides the background necessary for under-
standing life-cycle cost management and its application to
aviation systems. The magnitude of life-cycle cost is pre-
sented, including its cost elements included and the various
techniques of estimating these costs. A brief overview is
presented of the organizational structure of the Support
Equipment Division, Naval Air Systems Command and how it is
structured to analyze life-cycle costs.
A. THE MAGNITUDE OF LIFE-CYCLE COST
In an era of rising costs and increasing scrutiny of the
procurement system, the Department of Defense (DoD) has
adopted an af fordability acquisition policy. [Ref. l:p. 8]
The system must be affordable not only in terms of unit-pro-
duction cost, performance and schedule, but also in terms
of the total cost of ownership.
The ratio of operating and support cost to the total
cost of ownership varies depending on the author. All are
in agreement though, that downstream acquisition costs are
a considerable portion of total life-cycle costs. One
source states, "... funds required in supporting a system
are often cwice those spend' in acquiring it." [Ref. 2:p. 36
Another source claims, "Typical system operation and support
costs regularly exceed initial development by a factor of 10
15
to 1 . " [Ref. 3:p. 1] As substantial as these costs are, they
are largely determined early in the life of a system. An
Air Force Systems Command study concluded that "85% of wea-
pon system lifetime costs are locked in by the time the
decision is made to begin full scale development." [Ref. 4:
p. 32]
Aviation support equipment plays heavily in determining
the total cost of a system. Not only is support equipment
the second largest budget program at the Naval Air Systems
Command [Ref. 5:p. 26] but it may account for 10% to 50% of
the cost of the prime equipment. [Ref. 6:p.88]
It can be concluded from the figures just quoted that
downstream costs are significant. The Navy recognizes this
and supports the position that "LCC should be an integral
part of management's cost control and reduction efforts."
[Ref. l:p. 5]
The essence of life-cycle cost (LCC) management is best
summed up in a quotation from A. M. Frayer of the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense. "First design for sup-
port; then support the design." [Ref. 7:p. 40] Controlling
and managing the total cost of ownership of a system does
not mean that the lowest cost is necessarily the most via-
ble alternative. What it does mean is that "LCC management
seeks to maintain a balance among the principal acquisition
objectives of performance, schedule, cost and supportability .
"
[Ref. 8:p. 1-3] It should be established early that develop-
ing LCC estimates is not an attempt to predict the future but
16
is an attempt to plan wisely for future situations. [Ref.
6: p. 117]
The principal application of life-cycle cost has been
explained as follows: "It gives quantitative guidance in
the program and project office for making tradeoffs among
manpower, cost, schedule, performance and logistic support."
[Ref. l:p. 5]
Other sources describe the management effort as " . . .
a search for the significant costs that can be influenced
by planning and design decisions." [Ref. 6:p. 18] Still
another author portrays the effort as ". . .a control meth-
od intended to stimulate long term contractor interest in
an acquisition effort." [Ref. l:p. 21]
Don Earles, Manager, Life-Cycle Analysis, Raytheon Co.,
Huntsville, Alabama, recognizes the impact that total cost
management has throughout the procurement process by observ-
ing that:
Life-cycle costing is a costing discipline, a procurement
technique, an acquisition consideration and a tradeoff
tool.
As a costing discipline it is primarily concerned
with operating and support (O&S) cost-estimating methods.
As a procurement technique it is concerned with minimiz-
ing total life costs for component procurements. As an
acquisition consideration its primary concerns are source
selection and the balancing of acquisition and ownership
costs. As a tradeoff tool its primary concerns are re-
pair levels and the impact of specific design features
on operating and support costs. [Ref. 9:p. 39]
There are three basic elements to a life-cycle cost
management program: a methodology, a command and easy-to-
use LCC analysis framework tailored for use on each
17
acquisition, and procurement techniques that permit bias-
free competition. [Ref. 10:p. 377]
The methodology provides a structure for design analysis
to reduce life-cycle costs. This methodology is supported
by early testing and engineering analysis where it can do
the most good and is backed up by contractual incentives
to improve operational reliability. [Ref. 10:p. 377]
The third element in the program is procurement techniques
which includes ". . . independent agency review and assess-
ment, and feedback of LCC inputs from the test program where
appropriate." [Ref. 10:p. 377]
Closely related to life-cycle cost management is the con-
cept of design-to-cost (DTC). Although Directives define DTC
as a balance between total cost of ownership, schedule and
performance, the term is used by many managers to mean design
to unit production cost. [Ref. 11] Design-to-cost is for-
mally defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation as fol-
lows:
Design-to-cost is a concept that establishes cost elements
as management goals to achieve the best balance between
life-cycle cost, acceptable performance, and schedule.
Under this concept, cost is a design constraint during
the design and development phases and a management disci-
pline throughout the acquisition and operations of the
system or equipment. [Ref. 12:p. 7-1]
The magnitude of life-cycle cost is significant, with
some estimates for operating and support costs exceeding ac-
quisition costs by a ratio of 10 to 1. Support equipment
has been estimated to account for 10 to 50 percent of the
cost of the prime equipment. Recognizing the magnitude of
ownership costs, the Navy is seeking to maintain a balance
between acquisition objectives of performance, schedule,
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cost and supportability . Design-to-cost, although often
referred to as design-to-unit-production cost, is one pro-
gram to manage the total cost of ownership of a system.
B. COSTS INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL COST OF OWNERSHIP
"The foundation of any life-cycle cost program is an es-
timate of total program costs which can be used to identify
the major cost drivers." [Ref. 10:p. 377] The costs typi-
cally included are research and development (R&D), acquisi-
tion, operating and support (O&S) costs and the cost of
disposal with the interest focusing principally on future
costs regardless of whether or not they are under the acqui-
sition manager's control. [Ref. l:p. 27] Special attention
is given to those major cost drivers that can be influenced
by planning and design decisions with the question of cost
relevancy being unique for each acquisition. [Ref. l:p. 27]
Research and development costs are generally the first
incurred and include R&D for peculiar support equipment ( PSE
R&D costs are defined as follows:
All of the expenses incurred during the concept explora-
tion, demonstration/validation, and full scale development
phases of the acquisition which result in the engineering
drawings, specifications, and other documents necessary
to enter the investment phase of the life cycle are classi-
fied as R&D costs. [Ref. l:pp. 27-28]
Investment costs are usually incurred during the produc-
tion and development phase and include expenditures for the
major system and both common and peculiar support equipment.
[Ref. l:p. 28]
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Operating and support costs are usually the largest part
of the total cost of ownership and are broken into two phases;
deployment and operations and recurring support [Ref. 6: p. 67]
The deployment phase includes initial non-recurring costs such
as training and provisioning while the operating and support
phase includes the costs incurred during the use of a system
[Ref. 6:p. 67]. The various elements included in operating
and support costs are: "... personnel, material, and over-
head costs used in operating a system or equipment or in pro-
viding the services required to support the system." [Ref.
l:p. 28]
A detailed discussion of the elements and subelements to
be included when evaluating ownership costs is included in
Life Cycle Cost in Navy Acquisitions. [Ref. 1] A detailed
discussion of the life-cycle cost structures is beyond the
scope of this research.
The general framework for determining the total cost of
a system is applicable to both major systems and subsystems
such as support equipment. Part of the decision process in
selecting an item of automatic test equipment (ATE) is to
conduct a life impact cost analysis (LICA). [Ref. 13:p.
1-11] "LICA is a modeling effort to determine the lifetime
support costs of any ATE selection decision." [Ref. 13:p.
F-l] The costs reviewed during a LICA are:
* Non-recurring and recurring acquisition,
* Non-recurring and recurring support equipment,
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* 15-year support equipment operating and support ( ILS )
,
and
* Avionics related costs that are impacted by the
selection. [Ref. 13:p. 1-11]
The cost of a system includes research and development,
production, operating and support and disposal cost. Oper-
ating and support costs are usually the greatest share of
the total cost. The ownership costs for ATE are reviewed
during the life impact cost analysis and are to be considered
when selecting a piece of support equipment to be developed.
C. COST ESTIMATING METHODOLOGIES
There are basically three approaches to estimating total
life-cycle costs. They are the analogy, parametric and en-
gineering methods of cost estimating. Each method has
unique characteristics which may make it more suitable for
one phase of the acquisition process as opposed to another.
"The degree of product refinement determines the applica-
bility of each technique." [Ref. l:p. 42]
In general, analogy and parametric are most useful during
the early stages of a product's life, serving as an order-
of -magnitude estimate of the potential costs. As the
design stabilizes and more information becomes available,
parametric cost estimating becomes a more useful tech-
nique. Later, when the detailed product design has
occurred and specific tasking requirements can be levied,
engineering estimates and the projection of actuals may
become a more appropriate device for estimating cost.
[Ref. l:p. 42]
Analogy is a methodology which takes actual, historical
cost data and applies adjustments for such things as: dif-
ferences in technology, geography, configuration, specifica-
tions, operational environment, quantities and schedules
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[Ref. l:p. 42]. "This technique relates the cost of a cur-
rent acquisition or alternative acquisition under considera-
tion to that of similar previous acquisitions." [Ref. l:p.
42] One of the difficulties inherent in the use of analogous
estimating is the inability to assess the effect of changes
in the technological sophistication of products. [Ref. 1:
p. 43]
Parametric estimating uses cost estimating relation-
ships (CERs) to determine the total cost of a system. CERs
are mathematical relationships between some variable charac-
teristic and the cost of a product. [Ref. l:p. 43] This
technique is not well-suited to the early phases of procure-
ment and is best suited for the later stages of full-scale
development.
Parametric operating and support costing can be a viable
technique during the later stages of the full scale
development phase when the contractor has been able to
collect preliminary data relevant to component failure
rates, repair costs, and other logistics related param-
eters for engineering models or early operational models.
[Ref. l:p. 44]
Parametric estimating is dependent upon an accurate his-
torical cost data base. The existing data bases and cost
collection techniques are considered by many to be ineffective
Compounding this problem is the lack of an effective data
collection process for accumulating and aggregating the
historical O&S costs of major weapon systems. Elaborate
techniques exist for collecting data on such sublevel
items as part demand rates, maintenance actions, and
other logistics factors, but these discrete methods sup-
port specific logistic management functions which do not
provide an interactive data base for deriving CERs.
[Ref. l:p. 44]
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The engineering estimate has little or no relevance dur-
ing concept exploration and demonstration/validation [Ref. 1
p. 48]. It is however, a practical estimating tool for full-
scale development. Like parametric estimating, engineering
estimates are dependent on a historical data base. Engineer-
ing estimates are "bottom up" estimates which synthesize the
detailed costs associated with each part of the acquisition.
It is the most detailed way of estimating costs. [Ref. 1:
p. 45]
Estimating future ownership costs has some built in un-
certainties. To minimize the effect of these uncertainties
specific information should be provided to the cost analyst.
Any description of future events or circumstances is
speculative and inherently uncertain; but to perform
an LCC analysis, the product under investigation
should have an adequate description of such aspects
as design, manufacture, testing, training, delivery,
deployment, operation, and support. [Ref. l:p.47]
The three most common cost estimating techniques in use
today are analogy, parametric and the engineering method of
cost estimation. The degree of product refinement deter-
mines the applicability of each technique.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
DIVISION
This section will provide a brief outline of the Support
Equipment Division, of the Naval Air Systems Command and the
procedures that are followed in determining the total cost
of ownership of support equipment. The structural framework
within which support equipment (SE) is managed is depicted
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in Figure 2-1. Air-310, Air-417, Air-552, Activity are
specifically concerned with the design, development, pro-
duction, management and deployment of support equipment.
[Ref. 5:p 12] However, each of the functional areas is
either directly or indirectly associated with support
equipment.
The Support Equipment Division (Air-552) is divided into
three branches according to the type of equipment being
managed. The branches as shown in Figure 2-2 are: Weapon
Systems and Acquisition Branch (Air-5521), Avionic Systems
Support Equipment Branch (Air-5522) and the Propulsion Sys-
tems Support/Handling and Servicing Equipment Branch (Air-
5523). Each branch has the responsibility for "...
managing research, design, development, test, evaluation and
modification" [Ref. 14:p. 5521-3] for their respective sys-
tems. Each branch is in turn subdivided as illustrated in
Figure 2-3 for Air-5521, Figure 2-4 for Air-5522, and Fig-
ure 2-5 for Air-5523. The responsibilities of each branch
include: budgeting, funding, design, development, test and
evaluation, acquisition, and delivery of all support equip-
ment under their cognizance.
The organizational structure for determining ownership
costs for support equipment are not as clearly defined. In
conducting this research the researcher was unable to deter-
mine the procedures for projecting the life-cycle cost of
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Figure 2-5. Propulsion Systems Support/Landing and
Servicing Equipment Branch [Ref. 14:p. 5523-1]
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The procurement process for SE is set in motion by the
identification of a need for additional support equipment
by either the fleet, NAVAIR Headquarters, a field support
activity, or a contractor involved in weapon system
development. [Ref. 5:p. 27] Regardless of whether the need
is for peculiar or common SE, the requirement is documented
by the submission of a support equipment requirement docu-
ment (SERD). The SERD contains a technical description,
drawings and cost information for the proposed item.
Determining the life-cylce cost of ATE is part of the
support equipment selection analysis (SESA) and is defined
in detail in the SE Selection Guide. The technical analysis,
as well as the cost analysis, is performed by the Naval Air
Engineering Center (NAEC) in Lakehurst, New Jersey. [Ref.
13:p. 1-12] According to the Guide, the SESA and the selec-
tion process should be completed soon after the prime system
enters full-scale development (FSD). This has the advantage
of permitting the modification of ATE and development of
test program sets (TPSs) while the prime system continues
through FSD. Completing the process early offers a higher
probability that the prime and support systems will be
ready to meet operational evaluation (OPEVAL) milestones.
[Ref. 13:p. 1-5]
The selection process is divided into three phases or
cycles: data collection, technical analysis, and cost and
management analysis. The data collection phase is concerned
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with the gathering and analyzing of test requirements in-
formation and comparing it with existing ATE. The final
product is a list of possible ATE candidates which possess
the general capabilities required. The second phase is
technical analysis and consists of an analysis of viable
alternatives and results in selecting those items which are
technically suitable. The final phase is cost and manage-
ment analysis. At this time, the life-cycle cost of each
alternative is developed and the inherent risks associated
with each alternative are evaluated. [Ref. 13:pp. 2-1 to
2-5]
A detailed discussion of the support equipment selection
process may be found in the SE Selection Guide [Ref. 13] and
further information concerning the historical development of
the Support Equipment Division may be found in Naval Avia-
tion Support Equipment Acquisition Policies and Procedures
In The 1980's [Ref. 5]
.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has pointed out that total life-cycle costs
exceed the procurement cost of a system by a wide margin
with aviation support equipment accounting for as much as
10% to 50% of the cost of the prime equipment. Costs typi-
cally included are: research and development, acquisition
and operating and support costs. Operating and support
cost is generally the largest single element. The most com-
mon methods for estimating these costs are the analogy,
parametric and engineering methodologies.
29
The life-cycle cost of aviation automatic test equipment
is evaluated during the support equipment selection analysis,
The actual cost estimating is performed by the Naval Air En-
gineering Center in Lakehurst, New Jersey.
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III. PROGRAMS TO MANAGE THE TOTAL COST OF OWNERSHIP
A. INTRODUCTION
Historically there have been a wide range of programs
and acquisition techniques employed to reduce the life-cycle
cost of a system. This chapter briefly describes some of
the methods which have been used. A discussion of the prob-
lems encountered with each approach is included in subse-
quent chapters. Before proceeding, it should be pointed out
that no one single program, with the exception of Design-To-
Cost (DTC) and competition, is intended to reduce each facet
of total ownership cost. Rather, each program is directed
at a particular segment of total cost. The program manager
may choose to employ any or all of the techniques to be
discussed.
B. DISCUSSION
1 . Design -To -Cost
Design-to-cost (DTC) is an acquisition methodology
which was implemented to place emphasis on life-cycle cost
throughout the acquisition process. It provides a manage-
ment framework within which to manage cost by; "Establish-
ing cost as a parameter equal in importance to technical and
supportability requirements and schedules." [Ref. 15:p. 1]
Some of the techniques which could be used to achieve DTC
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goals are standardization, value engineering, preplanned-
product improvement, warranties and competition.
2 . Competition
Competition is another tool which may be used to
reduce the total cost of ownership. Competition may be ap-
plied to major systems and components alike. Robert Seldon
stated that maintaining competition as long as possible is
a highly effective method of controlling life-cycle cost
[Ref. 6:p. 256]. Competition may be employed to reduce
total cost by including life-cycle cost as a source selec-
tion criteria. To win the contract, the contractor must
consider the total cost of ownership in his proposal.
To facilitate competition at the replenishment part
level, the DoD has been using a program referred to as
BREAKOUT. A replenishment part is defined to mean parts,
whether they are consumable or repairable, which are pro-
curred after provisioning to support the end item. Examples
of end items include aircraft, engines, electronic systems,
ground support and test equipment. [Ref. 16:p. s6-104]
BREAKOUT is a subset of the BOSS (Buy Our Spares Smart) pro-
gram which seeks to identify those parts which may be com-
petitively procured. This may entail competing the part
when more than one source is available or buying direct from
the actual manufacturer vice the prime contractor in a sole
source environment. The objective is to:
Reduce costs by "breakout" of parts for purchase from other
than prime weapon system contractors while maintaining the
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integrity of the systems and equipment in which the parts
are to be used. [Ref. 16:p. 6-102]
Costs are reduced by competing parts which previous-
ly were purchased from the prime contractor in a sole source
environment.
The general guidelines for BREAKOUT, as put forth by
the DoD, are:
* Parts should be identified for breakout as early as
possible,
* The preference is for breakout to competition,
* BREAKOUT improvement efforts shall continue throughout
the life-cycle of the system,
* Priority should be given to those parts offering the
greatest opportunity for breakout and potential savings,
and
* Small and disadvantaged businesses should be given
the opportunity to provide repair parts. [Ref. 16:p. 6-104
3 . Pre-Planned Product Improvement
3Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P I) is an acquisi-
tion concept which makes it possible to "develop and field
a new weapon system while improvements to that system are
being planned for phased integration." [Ref. 17:p. 5-46]
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P I is an acquisition concept which programs resources to
accomplish the orderly and cost effective phased growth of
a system's capability, utility and operational readiness
[Ref. 18:p. 18]. It is a proactive program in that it is
planned evolutionary growth as opposed to product improve-
ment and planned product improvement which are both reactive
programs. The concept has as one of its main objectives, to
reduce overall acquisition, operating and support costs [Ref.
18:p. 18]. One way in which this goal is achieved is by
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reducing the logistics support burdens caused by a dependency
on "cutting-edge" technology. [Ref. 18:p. 21]
4. Value Engineering
Value engineering (VE) is a method of procuring ma-
terials representing the "best buy" in terms of the function
to be performed [Ref. 20:p. 310]. "Value engineering is in-
tended to be a primary mechanism for cost reduction during
production and logistic support phases of the life of systems
and equipment." [Ref. 8:p. 2-20] Cost savings are realized
by identifying those parts or items which can perform the
required function as efficiently and inexpensively as
possible. [Ref. 20:p. 311]
The benefits of value engineering are recognized but
there is some concern over whether or not the Navy is taking
full advantage of them.
The use of VE during engineering development to support
the continuous review of systems and equipment against
design to objectives for acquisition and ownership costs
is potentially valuable in managing life cycle cost,
but the present emphasis is on the contractual mechanism
of the value engineering change proposal (VECP), a more
specific application. There is reason for concern, too,
over the level of VECP activity. [Ref. 8:p. 2-21]
Recognizing the economic advantages of a value
engineering program and the current shortcomings of that
program, Admiral Busey, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command,
forwarded a letter to contractors stating that the Navy is
serious about value engineering. The letter states that all




The lack of standardization is viewed as a major cost
driver for electronics [Ref. 3:p. 1] "It can be seen that
there is a complete lack of standardization-no standardiza-
tion in the connectors, the frames, the size of the card,
mechanical holding, etc." [Ref. 3:p. 1]
As defined in the Acquisition Strategy Guide, stand-
ardization is:
The process by which the Department of Defense achieves
the closest practicable cooperation among the Services
and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of re-
search, development, and production resources, and
agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use
of:
* Common or compatible operational, administrative,
and logistic procedures,
* Common or compatible technical procedures and criteria,
* Common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, com-
ponents, weapons, or equipment, and
* Common or compatible tactical doctrine with correspond-
ing organizational compatibility. [Ref. 17:p. 5-54]
Cost savings are realized through standardization
by reducing unnecessary proliferation, time savings, reduc-
ing risk by using parts with known performance histories and
by enhancing competition by increasing the number of suppli-
ers. [Ref. 17:p. 5-55] A disadvantage which should be
pointed out is that the "overzealous application of standards
may also restrict the incorporation of newer technology in
the system or in processes used in producing the system."
[Ref. 17:p. 5-55] Another disadvantage is that standardi-
zation may increase the life-cycle cost by reducing compe-
tition. Competition is reduced by limiting contract awards
to previous manufacturers. [Ref. 19]
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When one considers that there may be as many as 3000
items of peculiar support equipment (PSE) per weapon system
[Ref. 21] the need for standardization becomes apparent.
The Support Equipment Division of the Naval Air Systems Com-
mand has established a goal to maximize standardization.
Towards this end:
The contractor is required to use the Technical Informa-
tion File and the Standard General Purpose Electronic
Test Equipment File to identify support equipment cur-
rently in the inventory as possible end items to satisfy
the identified requirements. [Ref. 5:p. 32]
A recent development pertaining to standardization
is the implementation of Military Standard 2097 (AS) dated
24 July 1985, which requires the contractor to certify that
they have screened the existing inventory to identify exist-
ing test equipment which may be used.
6 . Maintenance Philosophy
Two other methods being employed to reduce the total
cost of aviation support equipment are by following a selec-
tion order of priority for automatic test equipment and by
analyzing various maintenance plans. The nature of the de-
cision concerning the maintenance philosophy is embodied in
this quotation:
The significant trade-off is the choice between placement
of support equipment at the user level for fast repair
and high visibility or placement at more remote locations,
using fewer equipments with more skilled personnel, for
cheaper repair but a lower availability due to the longer
turnaround time. This trade-off is done during the level-
of-repair analysis (LORA). [Ref. 6:p. 88]
NAVAIR's recognition of the high cost of support equipment
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and the desire to control such costs is reflected in the ATE
selection order of priority. The priority as defined in a
letter issued by the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command is:
a. Use of existing ATE--unmodif ied,
b. Use of existing ATE with minor modification,
c. Use of existing ATE with major modification, and
d. Development of new tester(s) to meet requirements.
The development and procurement of new automatic
test equipment beyond the family of testers currently
defined, represent a proliferation of peculiar avionics
support equipment that the family of testers approach
is intended to preclude. As such, any authorization
to design, develop and/or acquire new ATE not officially
approved and part of the NAVAIR family of ATE will re-




Built-in test equipment has been put forth as one
means of increasing operational availability; however, there
are some who doubt the economic feasibility of such an ap-
proach. "Usually, cost trade-offs show that the increased
acquisition costs of built-in test equipment must then be
justified, if at all, on the basis of the improved availa-
bility of the item." [Ref. 6:p. 218]
8 Incentives and Awards
Contractor incentives and award fees, although
slightly different, are both used to motivate the contractor
to pay special attention to designated areas of concern.
"Incentive contracts offer a means of motivating contractors
to achieve more than minimal program objectives without ex-
cessive risk." [Ref. 17:p. 5-29] Empnasis may be placed on
unit-production cost, schedule, performance, life-cycle cost,
reliability, maintainability, or any area the program office
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desires to receive special attention. To be effective in-
centive fees must be large enough to provide sufficient
motivation to the contractor. [Ref. 6:p. 134]
The cost savings are realized by the contractor im-
proving in areas such as reliability, maintainability, and
supportability . The process encourages communications be-
tween the contractor and the Government.
Through the incentive contracting process, which includes
Government/ industry dialogue, more realistic objectives
can emerge, leading to more realistic contractual commit-
ments-a key element in any contract. [Ref. 17:p. 5-30]
"Incentives are the main thrust of warranties/guar-
antees, and reliability/maintainability are the characteris-
tics typically addressed." [Ref. 17:p. 5-61] One type of
warranty which has been employed to improve reliability and
maintainability, ultimately reducing operating and support
costs, is the reliability improvement warranty (RIW). The
warranty places responsibility for total cost with the en-
tity that can best control it, the contractor. [Ref. 23:
p. 27]
The RIW is a fixed-price contractual incentive for
improving operational reliability and maintainability. The
economic incentive for the contractor is to enhance the re-
liability and maintainability of the product so as to mini-
mize his repair costs. It requires the repair of failures
of the equipment during use for a specified period of time,
usually five years with the minimum being three years. [Ref,
6:p. 140]
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9 . Test and Evaluation
Another method for reducing life-cycle cost is by
increasing reliability. Test and evaluation is one way to
accomplish this.
The Test Analyze and Fix (TAAF) approach is a testing
philosophy associated with developmental testing of
hardware to improve the reliability of systems and
equipment. Such development testing emphasizes re-
liability growth by using an iterative test-redesign-
retest process that identifies corrective action to
improve equipment design and manufacturing processes.
[Ref. 17:p. 5-58]
The technique creates cost savings by reducing the
number of deficiencies which must be corrected after a system
is fielded and minimizes the need to introduce improvements
to obtain the original operational reliability objectives.
[Ref. 17:p. 5-58] A significant drawback of TAAF is the
increased requirements for time, money and personnel early
in the development program. Required funding can be as
much as 5 to 10 percent of the development program. [Ref.
17:p. 5-59]
TAAF has been successfully used on selected avionics
and mechanical systems of the F-18 aircraft. "It is esti-
mated that the TAAF testing added $100 million to the RDT&E
program but will save the program many times that amount
through lower operational support costs throughout it's life
cycle." [Ref. 17:p. 5-61]
10. Integrated Logistics Support
Integrated Logistics Support ( ILS ) is a management
effort directed at the largest portion of life-cycle cost:
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the operating and support phase of the life of a system.
"ILS is the integrating framework within the program's con-
cepts and techniques work to control life-cycle costs."
[Ref. 8:p. 4-1] It is defined as:
. . . a unified approach to the management and technical
activities necessary to: cause support considerations to
influence requirements and design; define support require-
ments that are operationally related to the design and to
each other; (procure) the required support; and provide
the required support during the operational phase at
minimum cost. [Ref. 24:p. 2-5]
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented some of the management methods
which have been used to administer various elements making up
the total cost of a system including: (1) design-to-cost, (2)
competition, (3) pre-planned product improvement, (4) value
engineering, (5) standardization, (6) maintenance philosophy,
(7) built-in test equipment, (8) incentives and awards, (9)
test and evaluation, and (10) integrated logistics support.
Only two of the techniques described are directed at total
cost: design-to-cost and competition. Integrated logistics
support provides a framework within which to manage and re-
duce the costs incurred in operating and supporting a system.
A total life-cycle cost management program is the framework
within which a program manager works to control the total
cost of a system.
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IV. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF LIFE-CYCLE COST
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the Department of Defense and
Navy Instructions and Directives which outline the policy
towards managing LCC. The Directives also outline the frame-
work within which Navy cost analysts operate in preparing
and evaluating these estimates.
The basic policy of the DoD concerning major system ac-
quisition is best described by an excerpt from the Military
Handbook on Life-Cycle Cost in Navy Acquisitions.
In an effort to maintain an effective, modern force in an
acquisition environment constrained by finite resources
and rising costs, an af fordability acquisition policy has
been adopted by DoD. The keystone of the affordability
policy is an estimate of the total cost of a program or
project over it's useful life, i.e., it's LCC. [Ref. 1:
p. 8]
The Directives will be discussed in a sequence which
parallels the procurement process. The first item to be
discussed is OMB Circular A-109, Major System Acquisitions.
It established the broad policies and objectives of Govern-
ment procurement. DoDD 5000.1, Major System Acquisition,
establishes the policies of A-109 as those of the Department
of Defense. These policies are implemented by DoDD 5000.2,
Major System Acquisition Procedures. The next Directive to
be discussed outlines the emphasis to be placed on ownership
costs during the source selection process. This is DoDD
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4105*62, Selection of Contractual Sources for Major Defense
Systems. This will be followed by the Directives on design-
to-cost and integrated logistics support. DoDD 5000.3, Test
and Evaluation, and DoDD 5000.4, OSD Cost Analysis Improve-
ment Group, provide the framework within which to monitor
progress and evaluate life-cycle cost estimates. The SE
Selection Guide provides a detailed description of the pro-
cedures to be followed in selecting automatic test equip-
ment (ATE).
It should be pointed out that while the items discussed
are "directive" in nature for major systems, the policies,
principles and objectives described therein are equally ap-
plicable to less than major systems, e.g., aviation support
equipment.
B. DISCUSSION
1 . Federal Procurement Policy
OMB Circular A-109 was issued on April 5, 1976 in
response to the report of the Commission on Government Pro-
curement which called for a disciplined acquisition process.
The purpose of the Circular is to "establish policies to be
followed by executive branch agencies in the acquisition of
major systems". [Ref. 25:p. 1] The Circular sets forth
the general policy, management objectives, and identifies
the key decisions to be made in major systems acquisition.
The four key decisions to be made are:
* Identification and definition of a specific mission need,
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* Selection of competitive system designs to be advanced
to a test/demonstration phase,
* Commitment of a system to full-scale development and
limited production, and
* Commitment of a system to full production. [Ref. 25:
P. 7]
The Circular focuses on the effectiveness of the management
of major systems acquisition and emphasizes innovation and
competition.
The importance to be placed on the total cost of a
system is first brought out in the definitions of mission
need and program objectives. As defined in A-109: "...
mission need means a required capability within an agency's
overall purpose, including cost and schedule considerations."
[Ref. 25:p. 2] Program objectives are defined to mean:
".
. . the capability, cost and schedule goals being sought
by the system acquisition program in response to a mission
need." [Ref. 25:p. 2] Each definition includes the word
"cost", yet whether it refers to unit production cost (UPC),
or total cost of ownership, is not specifically stated.
Although not clearly defined, when taken in context with the
entire Circular, it is the researcher's position that cost
is referring to the total cost of ownership.
The policies of A-109 are designed to " . . . ensure
the effectiveness and efficiency of the process of acquiring
major systems." [Ref. 25:p. 3] The Circular calls for the
expression of needs in mission terms vice equipment terms.
Given that the definition of mission needs includes costs,
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this means that the total cost of ownership is to be consid-
ered when establishing needs. To accomplish this it is
pointed out that competition should be pursued during the
concept exploration phase to encourage the development of
alternative system design concepts. [Ref. 25:p. 3] As will
be pointed out in a subsequent chapter, early involvement is
essential to the success of an LCC management effort.
The importance of life-cycle cost management is fur-
ther emphasized in the acquisition objectives identified in
the Circular. Specifically, an acquisition strategy should
be tailored to each acquisition and the program manager
should ensure that appropriate trade-offs are conducted be-
tween critical program elements, one of which is ownership
costs. Additionally, to bring attention to cost management
early in a program, benefits to be derived from trade-offs
between technical performance, acquisition costs, ownership
costs and schedule, should be considered during the source
selection process. [Ref. 25:p. 9]
Because of it's importance, the next objective is
quoted in it's entirety.
Maintain a capability to: * Predict, review, assess,
negotiate and monitor costs for system development,
engineering, design, demonstration, test, production,
operation and support (i.e., life-cycle costs).
*Assess acquisition cost, schedule and performance
experience against predictions, and provide such
assessments for consideration by the agency head
at key decision points. * Make new assessments
where significant costs, schedule or performance
variances occur. * Estimate life-cycle costs during
system design, concept evaluation and selection,
full-cale development, facility conversion, and
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production, to ownership costs, schedules, and performance.
* Use independent cost estimates, where feasible, for com-
parison purposes. [Ref. 25:p. 5]
The important elements of this objective are that
the Navy is to develop life-cycle cost estimates, use inde-
pendent cost estimates for comparison purposes and monitor
them during each stage of the procurement process. Notice-
ably absent is the lack of a requirement to assess LCC ex-
perience against predictions and the use of such assessments
at key decision points. The objective only calls for the
analysis of acquisition cost, schedule and performance.
To briefly summarize, OMB Circular A-109 states that
it is the policy of the Government to procure effective,
affordable systems. Affordable is further explained to be
an appropriate balance between technical performance, acqui-
sition costs, ownership costs, and time to develop and pro-
cure a system.
2 . Department of Defense Acquisition Policy
for Major Systems
DoDD 5000.1, Major System Acquisition, is the Depart-
ment of Defense statement of policy for the acquisition of
major systems. The Directive implements OMB Circular A-109
and is the governing directive for the acquisition of major
systems except when statuatory requirements override. Al-
though focused on major systems acquisitions, the principles
and objectives are equally applicable to less than major
systems. [Ref. 26:p. 2] This can be interpretted to mean
that the same emphasis being placed on cost and supportability
for major systems should also be placed on support equipment.
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The concern for supportability is a primary issue
throughout the Directive. It calls for the consideration
of logistic supportability early in the formulation of the
acquisition strategy and in its implementation. To accom-
plish one of the primary objectives of the acquisition pro-
cess, which is improved readiness and sustainability , equal
emphasis should be placed on resources required to enhance
supportability, performance and schedule. [Ref. 26 :p. 2]
System af fordability is heavily emphasized. "Af-
fordability, which is a function of cost, priority, and
availability of fiscal and manpower resources, shall be con-
sidered at every milestone and during the PPBS process."
[Ref. 26:p. 6] Cost was not specifically defined in A-109
nor is it defined here. When the Directive is read as a
whole it can be concluded that cost means the total cost of
ownership as opposed to unit-production cost (UPC). To pro-
cure an affordable weapon system a balance should be sought
between acquisition cost, ownership cost, schedule and per-
formance. [Ref. 26:p. 3] Although ownership cost is em-
phasized it should not be construed that cost is to be the
overriding factor. To facilitate meaningful trade-off
studies, life-cycle cost estimates must be realistic, real-
istically budgeted and the effort realistically funded.
[Ref. 26:p. 2]
3 . Major System Acquisition Procedures
DoDi 5000.2, Major System Acquisition Procedures,
implements DoDD 5000.1. The Instruction spells out the
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procedures to be followed, and the documentation to be sub-
mitted, to attain the objectives listed in DoDD 5000.1.
Life-cycle cost receives early attention in the life
of a major system in that it is part of the documentation
required for a Justification for Major System New Start
( JMSNS ) . When a concept has been selected the procurring
office is required to submit gross estimates of the projected
life-cycle cost. [Ref. 27:p. 3-1]
A major system acquisition will normally be subjected
to two reviews by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC). Life-cycle cost will be considered at each
of these reviews. The first review is conducted at Mile-
stone I and serves as the basis for approval to proceed from
concept exploration (CE) to the demonstration and validation
phase (DEMVAL). Documentation for the review is provided in
the form of a System Concept Paper (SCP).
The SCP is used to summarize the results of the concept
exploration phase up to Milestone I, to describe the
DoD Components acquisition strategy, including identi-
fication of concepts to be carried into the demonstration
and validation phase, and reasons for elimination of
other concepts; and to establish goal thresholds, and
threshold ranges (as appropriate) to be met and reviewed
at the next milestone. [Ref. 27:p. 4]
The second major review is at Milestone II and
serves as the basis for approval to move from DEMVAL to
full-scale development (FSD). Documentation for Milestone
II is provided in the form of a Decision Coordinating Paper/
Integrated Program Summary (DCP/IPS).
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The DCP/IPS consists of two documents that provide dif-
ferent levels of detail for consideration by the DSARC.
The DCP is a top-level summary document that identifies
alternatives, goals, thresholds, and threshold ranges,
as appropriate. The IPS will provide more specific
information on the program and shall be prepared when
the DAE determines that the DCP lacks information on
which to base the requisite decision. [Ref. 27:p. 4]
The same format is used for both the SCP and the
DCP. LCC requirements are clearly indicated in the annexes
to the basic format. The annexes are:
* Annex A: Example of Program Structure.
* Annex B: Thresholds.
* Annex C: Resources-Cost Track Summary.
* Annex D: Resources-Funding Profile.
* Annex E: Summary of Life-Cycle Cost of Alternatives.
The Cost Track Summary requires cost estimates for
the total operating and support phase, the average annual
system O&S costs, and the total life-cycle requirements.
The Funding Profile also calls for an estimate of total
life-cycle requirements and Annex E contains a summary of
life-cycle cost alternatives. As the title implies, the
Annex contains a list of alternatives and the total cost of
ownership for each. Annex B lists the thresholds to be
achieved by Milestones II and III. The cost thresholds
listed are: RDT&E (total), procurement (total), flyaway
(unit) and procurement (unit). Absent from the cost thres-
holds is life-cycle cost.
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4. Source Selection , Policies and Procedures
From a life-cycle cost management perspective, this
Directive details the emphasis which should be placed on the
total cost of a system during the source selection process.
As is the case with DoDD 5000.1, the provisions of this Di-
rective are also applicable to less than major systems, i.e.,
support equipment. [Ref. 28:p. 1] The attention that should
be afforded cost is dependent on the specified relative order
of importance assigned to cost in the solicitation, which
should be detailed in the evaluation criteria to be used.
When cost is weighted in development source selections,
the specified relative order of importance is intended
to provide general guidance to offerors on the relative
importance that the Government attaches to cost consid-
erations, including unit production cost and life cycle
cost objectives. Such guidance is intended to be used
by offerors to include af fordability considerations
when making tradeoffs to achieve a balanced proposal
that is responsive to mission requirements while also
reflecting program constraints. [Ref. 28:p. 5]
The Directive recognizes the use of draft RFPs as
a valuable source of information from prospective contrac-
tors and encourages their use. Information which may be
derived from draft RFPs includes the identification of cost
drivers, noncost-ef fective contract requirements and the
identification of any other changes that would enhance the
acquisition program by improving system performance or by
reducing life-cycle costs. [Ref. 28:p. 7]
Independent cost estimates should be utilized in
determining the cost realism of proposals submitted and to
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serve as a benchmark for comparative purposes. "The realism
of the offeror's proposal should be indicated by a ranking
relative to the Government's estimate." [Ref. 28: p. 8]
In summary, the Directive identifies the many vari-
ables that should be considered during the source selection
process. To facilitate obtaining program objectives, a well-
formatted acquisition strategy should be developed prior to
the initial solicitation. In evaluating cost proposals in-
dependent Government estimates should be used to determine
cost realism. The use of draft RFPs is identified as a po-
tentially beneficial tool and, finally; cost proposals are
evaluated from the standpoint of total cost to the Govern-
ment as well as reasonableness and realism of the cost
estimate.
5. Design -To -Cost
The purpose of this Directive is to ". . . update
policies, responsibilities, and procedures for the applica-
tion of design-to-cost (DTC) principles throughout the acqui-
sition of defense systems, subsystems, and equipment."
[Ref. 15:p. 1] Again, the Directive is applicable to all
major systems and less than major systems as determined by
the DoD Component [Ref. 15:p. 5]. The researcher views
this Directive as critical to a life-cycle management effort
and many of its provisions will be quoted in their entirety.
Before discussing the provisions of the Directive,
it is necessary to point out the differences between goals,
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objectives, parameters, targets and thresholds. A goal is a
firm cost or value which should be attained as opposed to an
objective which is a tentative value and is subject to revi-
sion. DTC parameters are approved, measurable values to be
used as design considerations and management objectives for
subsequent life-cycle phases. Parameters are further sub-
divided into DTC targets. A threshold is a cost or value
which if exceeded will cause a program review. [Ref. 15:p.
2-1]
The distinction between a goal and a parameter is
important. As just mentioned, a goal is a cost or value
that should be attained and, along with thresholds, must be
included in the Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
(SDDM) for approval. [Ref. 15:p. 3] Parameters, on the
other hand, are approved, measurable values used as design
considerations and management objectives for subsequent
life-cycle phases and do not require approval of higher
authority.
The design-to-cost policy of the DoD is to:
* Establish cost as a parameter equal in importance to
technical and supportability requirements and schedules.
* Establish credible acquisition and operating and
support (O&S) DTC parameters that are consistent with
program plans and budgets and that achieve the best
balance among cost, schedule, performance, reliability,
and supportability characteristics.
* Require that cost considerations be addressed through-
out the design, development, production, and deployment
of defense systems, subsystems, and equipment.
* Ensure prompt cost feedback to engineers and managers
to enable effective and timely cost reduction actions.
[Ref. 15:pp. 1-2]
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The Directive calls for the early identification of
cost and performance trade-offs to achieve a proper balance
between acquisition and O&S costs. Some of the cost reduc-
ing techniques which may be employed are: value engineering,
alternative operations and maintenance concepts, increased
use of standardized and commercial equipment, producibility
analysis, and industrial modernization incentives.
DTC objectives are required to be established during
concept exploration. "As system definition continues the
objectives shall become DTC goals or thesholds, and the sys-
tem shall be designed to achieve these parameters." [Ref.
15:p. 2] Specifically, an acquisition DTC goal in the form
of average unit flyaway (rollaway or sailaway) cost shall
be established and DTC parameters for O&S costs such as man-
power and maintenance requirements shall be established.
[Ref. 15: p. 3] Nowhere in the Directive does it call for
the establishment of O&S goals or thresholds.
The DTC goals and thresholds shall be identified and
realistic and DTC targets shall be included in prime contracts
[Ref. 15: p. 4] Furthermore:
Program managers shall identify high-risk or high-cost
components, which are the major life cycle cost drivers
that provide the greatest opportunity for design trade-
offs. During contract performance, containing "cost
driver" costs shall be emphasized. [Ref. 15:p. 4]
To motivate the contractor to earnestly manage cost,
contractual incentives will be used ". . . to provide a fi-
nancial reward to contractors after a demonstration that
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actual costs or other measureable factors are at or below
stated DTC goals." [Ref. 15:p. 4] If a contractor's per-
formance is to be evaluated progress towards achieving goals
must be monitored. The Directive specifically calls for the
tracking of all DTC parameters until they have been met.
6 . Policy for the Acquisition and Management of
Integrated Logistic Suport Systems and Equipment
Integrated logistics support ( ILS ) is an integral
part of the acquisition process and provides the framework
within which operating and support costs, a major portion of
life-cycle cost, are controlled. This Directive establishes
the requirement for life-cycle management of major system ILS
and provides guidance for establishing ILS policy for less
than major systems and equipment. [Ref. 14:p. 1] The policy
of the DoD is to:
. . . ensure that resources to achieve readiness receive
the same emphasis as those required to achieve schedule
and performance objectives .... These resources
shall include those necessary to design desirable sup-
port characteristics into systems and equipment as well
as those to plan, develop, acquire, and evaluate the
support. [Ref. 14:p. 2]
To achieve the objectives of ILS, which is "to
achieve system readiness at an affordable life-cycle cost",
[Ref. 14:p. 2] provisions for an ILS program which begins
at program initiation and continues throughout the life of
the system, shall be included in the acquisition strategy.
The program shall focus on designing in desirable support
characteristics, manpower, personel and training require-
ments, evaluation of alternative support concepts and; "The
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early establishment of system readiness and supportability
thresholds for verification or assessment during test and
evaluation (T&E) before decision milestones." [Ref. 14:p. 2]
The availability of operating and support cost data
is recognized as being an important element in conducting
design trade-offs. The Directive requires that such infor-
mation will be maintained and incorporated into the Visi-
bility and Management of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC)
data collection system. The information is also to be made
available to developers of new systems at the level of detail
needed to support design trade-offs. [Ref. 14:p. 4]
Briefly, DoDD 5000.39, calls for the establishment
and funding of an ILS effort at the onset of a program. Em-
phasis shall be placed on designing in supportability, en-
abling a system to be fielded which will meet the operational
requirements at the lowest total cost. Technical and cost
data will be collected throughout the life of the system to
be used for comparative purposes when fielding new systems.
7 . Test and Evaluation
DoDD 5000.3, Test and Evaluation, details the policy
for the conduct of test and evaluation by the Military De-
partments in the acquisition of defense systems. Those fac-
tors which will directly affect LCC are evaluated during
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). OT&E is that test
and evaluation conducted to estimate a system's operational
effectiveness and operational suitability, and will be
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conducted in as realistic and operational environment as
possible. [Ref. 29:p. 3]
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) is
conducted prior to Program Milestone III and is generally
keyed to a decision point in each of the major acquisition
phases. During concept exploration, OT&E is conducted to
evaluate competing technical approaches and to assist in
selecting alternative systems concepts. During demonstra-
tion and validation (DEMVAL), OT&E will be conducted in as
realistic an environment as possible to provide information
relative to projected operational effectiveness and suita-
bility of the candidate systems. OT&E is conducted during
full-scale engineering development to provide a valid esti-
mate of operational effectiveness and suitability. [Ref. 29:
p. 4]
Initial Operation Test and evaluation provides the
program manager with an additional tool to assess progress
towards achieving assigned cost goals and thresholds.
8 . The Cost Analysis Improvement Group
DoDD 5000.4, OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(CAIG), sets forth the policies and procedures to be followed
by the CAIG. The CAIG is the principal advisory body to the
DSARC on matters related to cost. Their primary duties are
to review and evaluate cost estimates submitted by program
offices, identify efforts needed to improve the technical
capability of DoD to make cost estimates, and perform an in-
dependent analysis of each alternative and provide a
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projection of all elements of LCC to include: R&D, invest-
ment and O&S. [Ref. 30:p. 2]
9. The Suport Equipment Selection Guide
The SE (Support Equipment) Selection Guide details
the procedures to be followed in the selection of Automatic
Test Equipment (ATE). The Selection Guide is applicable
only to avionic systems and not to propulsion systems, sup-
port and handling equipment or weapon systems.
The necessity to make the optimum use of available
resources is given early attention as is the need to identi-
fy support equipment requirements early in the prime system
development cycle.
It is the policy of the Department of the Navy to manage
ATE development, acquisition and utilization to ensure
the cost effective mix of resources for each level of
maintenance activity. Determination of the optimum mix
requires comprehensive analysis within the context of
overall U.S. Navy requirements, as opposed to system
or platform-unique requirements. In addition, solutions
to support requirements must be reached as early as
practicable in the prime system development cycle, to
ensure the timely acquisition and operation of ATE to
support those systems. [Ref. 13:p. iii]
The manual outlines the procedures to be followed
during the Support Equipment Selection Process (SESA). The
SESA is divided into three phases: data collection, techni-
cal analysis and cost and management analysis. [Ref. 13 :p.
1-2] The cost and management analysis is further divided
into a Life Impact Cost Analysis (LICA) phase and a Program
and Risk Evaluation (PRE) phase. It is during the LICA that
LCC estimates are developed.
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LICA is a modeling effort to determine the lifetime
support costs of any ATE selection decision. It involves
the identification and quantification of all cost impacts
associated with each SE alternative under consideration.
Cost is broken down into three categories: non-recurring
costs for development, recurring costs for production, and
operating and support costs. The analysis includes all the
expenses anticipated for each alternative that will be in-
curred by implementing that alternative. [Ref. 13 :p. 2-65]
The manual also provides a detailed outline of the Cost Ele-
ment Breakdown Structure ( CEBS ) for each of the three cost
categories.
It is pointed out that LCC estimates developed dur-
ing the analysis are just estimates and not fixed costs. It
is further stated that the "... estimates should be revised
as often as necessary in order to maintain the LICA as a val-
uable tool." [Ref. 13:p. 2-65] As will be pointed out later,
LCC estimates for both major systems and support equipment
are not updated as the system progresses through the acquisi-
tion process.
Finally, the importance given to the LICA report is
characterized by this statement: "The LICA report is likely
to achieve greater visibility than the other technical re-
ports due to greater emphasis on life-cycle cost as a manage-
ment tool." [Ref. 13:p. 2-81]
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The SE Selection Guide details the procedures that
should be followed in selecting automatic test equipment.
Part of the process is an analysis of the life-cycle cost of
alternative solutions which is conducted during the LICA.
Application of the process is limited to ATE.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an introduction to the regula-
tory framework within which the total cost of ownership of a
system is established and tracked. There are many common
elements to these Directives, some of which are:
* The policies and procedures for managing life-cycle
costs are equally applicable to major and less than
major systems,
* Total cost shall be afforded the same status given to
unit production cost, schedule and performance,
* Trade-off studies shall be conducted to achieve a
balance between investment costs, ownership costs,
schedules, and performance characteristics,
* Logistics supportability shall be given early manage-
ment attention,
* Independent life-cycle cost estimates shall be developed
and tracked, and
* A cost data base shall be maintained for feedback
purposes
.
The intent of all the Directives is to establish guide-
lines to enable the services to procure affective and afford-
able weapon systems.
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V. INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE REGARDING THE PROBLEMS
AND ISSUES OF MANAGING LIFE-CYCLE COST
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will explore the obstacles to managing
life-cycle cost (LCC) which have been identified by this
research in the literature and through interviews with con-
tractors for aviation support equipment.
After reviewing the literature and conducting several
interviews, the researcher has grouped the obstacles con-
fronting industry in the below listed categories. The
grouping will facilitate a discussion of the problems and
the identification of recommended solutions.
* Optimistic LCC estimates
* Government/industry interface
* Requests for proposals
* Lack of commitment
* Early commitment
* Communications between the end user and industry
* LCC goals and measurements
* Data base
* Aviation Support Equipment
B. DISCUSSION
1 . Optimistic LCC Estimates
The procurement system encourages submission of op-
timistic LCC estimates. Harvey J. Gordon, former Deputy for
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Acquisition, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force, recognized this and cited the program manager's
desire to obtain program approval as the reason. "Both the
military and industry tend to be optimistic in formulating
estimates to serve as a basis for authorization and approval."
[Ref. 31:p. 33] M. Robert Seldon, in his book entitled Life
Cycle Costing: A Better Method of Government Procurement
,
points out: "If the estimators understand that their fig-
ures are to be the basis for future budgets, they are likely
to inflate their estimates to provide a cushion for future
problems." [Ref. 6:p. 30] This padding of the estimates
obscures the true cost of a system.
Just as Navy PMs use optimistic estimates to win
program approval, contractors use optimistic estimates to
win the award of a contract. The Navy Program Manager's
Guide points out that in a competitive environment, the
ocntractor will tend to be over optimistic in the areas of
cost, schedule and technical accomplishment in an effort to
win the award.
At the outset of a program, our DoD bid process encourages
substantial contractor over optimism in technical accom-
plishment, in schedule, and in cost. The contractor en-
vironment is one of competition to win the support of the
evaluators of the proposal; thus the contractor very
much caters to the evaluator ' s interests. [Ref. 32:p.
4-35]
The point being made is that even when cost esti-
mators have sufficient information from which to develop
estimates, the figures submitted are intentionally optimis-
tic. This is viewed by the researcher as detracting from
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the overall effectiveness of an LCC management effort. The
foundation of any life-cycle cost program is an estimate of
total program cost and as such those estimates should be as
accurate as possible. [Ref. 10:p. 377]
When used to support budget submissions, optimistic
estimates have the potential of creating the appearance of
cost overruns which threaten the existence of a program and
detract from the credibility of the estimates. Use of esti-
mates which are not realistic negates the effectiveness of
an LCC management effort by establishing a baseline figure
which is not truly representative of current and projected
conditions. Finally, expenditure of already scarce re-
sources to support the development of a cost figure which
is not realistic and factually supportable is a waste of
those resources.
Related to the issue of obtaining realistic esti-
mates is the periodicity for submitting updates. While in-
terviewing Mr. Daniel Frank, the ILS Manager for advanced
requirements for Litton Guidance and Control Systems, it
was pointed out that provisions for updating LCC estimates
are presently included in contracts containing LCC clauses
with some updates being required as frequently as quarterly.
[Ref. 33] Mr. Frank also pointed out that due to the nature
of the estimates, they are not subject to rapid changes and
should be required no more frequently than semi-annually and,
when possible should be timed to support DSARC milestones.
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Requesting only essential updates is viewed by the research-
er as one means of reducing costs.
2 . Government/ Industry Interface
There is a general lack, of communications concern-
ing LCC between industry and the Navy. During one inter-
view, this interface was characterized as non-existent [Ref.
33]. During this same interview it was pointed out that the
company was not aware of how the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) was organized to handle or develop LCC estimates,
it was not known how the estimates were used and his company
had received no feedback concerning the estimates or updates
submitted. Another source characterized the relationship
between many Government and company managers as having grown
adversarial rather than open and cooperative [Ref. 8:p. 1-13]
The concern voiced by industry is shared by the Navy. As
one Navy ILS manager put it: "Too much emphasis is being
placed on strategy and not enough emphasis on the close
working relationship between the Government and contract
people. 1 ' [Ref. 11]
A strong Government/industry interface is essential
not only to the LCC management effort but to the success of
the program as a whole. Mr. 0. C. Boileau, President of
Boeing Aerospace Company in Seattle, stated: "If design-to-
life-cycle-cost programs are going to be successful, indus-
try and government will have to become full partners." [Ref.
34:p. 9] The importance of the interface to the success of
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a program is further emphasized in this excerpt from the
literature:
Success in acquiring products with low overall cost of
ownership would seem to depend on the ability of both
Government and company managers to work together in
handling the uncertain business of new product
development. [Ref. 8:p. 1-13]
Both parties must understand each other's needs and there
should be a free exchange of information. A close working
relationship not only makes it easier to solve immediate
problems but it also opens the channels for suggestions to
improve the process.
A close working relationship between industry and
the Navy before an RFP is released can help clarify vague
or non-existent requirements and ensure that the data needed
to develop an LCC estimate are available. Resolving any
problems or confusion before a contract is signed saves both
time and money and enhances the potential for a successful
program. Speaking as a panel member at the 1984 Acquisition
Strategy Workshop, Dr. A. Gates of Ford Aerospace, noted
that the lack of communications, which he characterized as
a lack of access to requirements documents, limits the abili-
ty of industry to fully understand what is required, thereby
reducing overall technology innovation across the industry.
[Ref. 35:p. 3]
A review of the literature will show that the tech-
nology in the avionics industry advances rapidly. In this
regard there is a degree of uncertainty which must be fac-
tored into the acquisition strategy for a new system or
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component. In a published paper, Richard P. White of the
Logistics Management Institute, recognized the dynamic na-
ture of contracting in an uncertain environment and the
need for flexibility by both parties.
In this regard, acquisition under uncertainty is, by
definition, a dynamic af fair--problems emerge in both
anticipated and unanticipated shapes. This environ-
ment does not sustain the usefulness of standard
operating procedures very often or very long, nor is
it subject to control by the most carefully planned
contractual nostrums. [Ref. 8:p. 1-13]
Mr. Frank, although critical of the present state
of the Government/ industry interface was quick to point out
it's advantages. [Ref. 33] He indicated that well-estab-
lished lines of communications provide the means for iden-
tifying and fully understanding LCC requirements before an
RFP is released. Feedback from the Navy enables industry
to better understand exactly what the Navy wants in the way
of cost estimaes. Industry feedback to the Navy can help
identify and resolve problems the Navy has with it's LCC
models
.
3 . Requests for Proposals
The RFP is one of the first instances of formal com-
munication between the Navy and industry and is used to con-
vey the information needed to develop LCC estimates and
plans to the contractor. As such, it sets the stage for
the future course of events. The literature supports the
claim that attitudes and priorities gleaned from the RFP
will be reflected in how the contractor responds. Recog-
nizing this, the failure to include LCC goals and requirements
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can only harm any future LCC management efforts. Inter-
views with Navy ILS managers, representatives of the aero-
space industry, and the literature, all characterize RFPs
as being vague with regard to LCC. RFPs are generally
characterized as lacking definition, information essential
to the development of LCC estimates is insufficient and LCC
goals and requirements are not included [Ref. 33]. Mr.
A. M. Frayer, a staff assistant in the Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense (I&L) in 1976, commented that LCC
goals and requirements should be specifically stated in RFPs
and statements of work [Ref. 7:p. 39].
The lack of adequate program information is detri-
mental to both parties of the contract. Industry needs re-
liable information to develop realistic estimates and the
Navy needs good information to develop in-house estimates
to use as a comparative baseline. Just as the needed infor-
mation is considered to be lacking for industry it is also
considered to be lacking for Navy ILS managers. Two Navy
ILS managers stated that program offices do not provide the
information necessary to prepare good estimates. The re-
quirements are either not adequately stated or not provided
at all [Ref. 11]
.
One interviewee stated that information essential
for determining meaningful estimates of operating and sup-
port costs is lacking from RFPs. Operational scenarios,
environmental data and employment information either do not
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contain sufficient information or are entirely lacking from
RFPs. Aside from being able to develop meaningful cost es-
timates , the lack of such information leaves the adverse
impression of insufficient front end planning on the part
of the Government. [Ref. 33]
Insufficient program data will increase the cost of
a program by increasing the risk to the contractor, partic-
ularly in the area of warranties. Forced to carry the risk
of uncertainty, the contractor will compensate by placing a
higher price tag on the warranty which ultimately translates
into increased LCC.
Contractors found that they were required to price
warranties based upon specified reliability and
maintainability levels with only limited develop-
ment program data to predict their ultimate field
reliability and warrant cost. [Ref. 36:p. 9]
The RFP is the formal document which will serve as
the basis for a proposal that will ultimately result in the
award of a contract. As one of the first pieces of formal
correspondence in the acquisition process, it also sets the
tone for future events. From discussions with industry and
reviewing the literature, the researcher would conclude
that:
* It is important that the Navy's intention to manage
LCC be clearly stated in the RFP.
* LCC goals and requirements must be clearly defined, and
* The RFP must contain sufficient operational, environ-
mental and deployment data to permit both Navy and
industry cost estimators to develop realistic LCC
estimates and management plans.
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4 . Lack of Commitment
It was previously stated that the attitudes and
priorities expressed in the RFP set the tone for the future
course of events. In a survey of military contractors con-
ducted by C. David Weimer in 1979, it was shown that most
military contractors are unconvinced of the Government's
commitment to LCC and it's contractual ramifications [Ref.
6:p. 150]. A 1974 GAO report indicated that the DoD was
placing less emphasis on the cost of ownership even though
such costs could ultimately amount to more than acquisition
costs. The report also points out that LCC have had limited
application in decisions affecting major systems acquisitions
due to uncertainty about the data used to develop estimates
and the need for better cost models and estimating
techniques. [Ref. 37:p. i]
Failure to include and properly emphasize the LCC
management effort in the RFP is one of several contributing
factors which have fostered the impression in both the Navy
and industry that the Navy is not fully committed to manag-
ing life-cycle cost. The apparent lack of commitment is
exemplified by both Navy and industry program managers who
worry more about production cost than LCC, and by the fact
that LCC efforts are readily sacrificed, if necessary, to
remain within budget. Interviews with both Navy and indus-
try ILS managers pointed out that little emphasis is placed
on LCC during concept exploration and when DTLCC programs
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have been incorporated they have been included at the last
minute and generally have not been well thought out« [Ref.
11]
The current emphasis being placed on design-to-unit-
production-cost (DTUPC) vice life-cycle cost , is due to part-
ly to a lack of understanding of the benefits to be derived
from LCC management and the fact that program managers are
evaluated based on the achievement of near term goals and
not long term supportability. This conclusion is supported
by a study conducted by LTC Caver of the Defense Systems
Management College.
A study done in 1979 showed that some 80 percent of the
people responding to the survey believed that PMs and
others in key decision-making positions in a system
development tend to direct their attention to near-term
acquisiton costs. Some 75 percent of those surveyed
viewed unit-production cost as more important than
life-cycle cost. [Ref. 35:p. 15]
Navy and industry ILS managers will point out that
PMs are evaluated on present performance, not on how well
the system can be supported or maintained in the future.
[Ref. 33] This view was also expressed by Richard P. White
in the following statement:
It is also a matter of concern that the program manager
may not be strongly motivated to authorize current ex-
penditures to benefit later operating and support costs,
particularly when present needs could claim all avail-
able funds. [Ref. 8:p. 2-25]
An Acquisition Improvement Working Group meeting in
March 1981 suggested that reliability, maintainability, op-
erational availability, and supportability be elevated to
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the same status as performance, schedule and unit production
cost. [Ref. 38:p. 132] The researcher views this action as
one means to increase the PM's commitment to LCC management.
Also contributing to the lack of commitment by both
industry and Government PMs is a lack of understanding as to
what can be accomplished in terms of cost savings through
following an LCC management strategy. Their present knowl-
edge as to how component parts interact is limited and there
is little understanding of how unit costs affect other areas
[Ref. 33]
Saying no to higher reliability for reasons of cost
does not in itself indicate a lack of commitment to life-
cycle cost management provided that the decision was the re-
sult of a cost-benefit analysis. Mr. Andrew Cozzolino, a
group engineer for Lockheed Support Equipment Engineering,
brough out the point that: "Many times engineers are told
no to higher reliability due to the cost involved and the
desire to remain within budget." [Ref. 39] Political con-
siderations which are difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify may also be the overriding factor.
The literature is unanimous in claiming that an im-
portant element in a successful LCC management program is
senior management participation. [Ref. 33] This applies
to both industry and Government. If the senior management
is not committed then there will be no interface and any
LCC efforts will be ineffective.
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Representatives from Litton, Teledyne and Lockheed
all recognized the future impact of LCC management and, de-
pending on the contractor, have already begun to develop
and implement LCC management strategies. Mr. Frank comment-
ed that just as there must be commitment at high Government
levels, corporate executives must also be fully committed
to managing LCC. Increased emphasis is being placed on LCC
when responding to RFPs, even when not specifically called
for. He also expressed the view that the ability to accu-
rately estimate LCC and incorporate them in proposals gave
his company a competitive edge. [Ref. 33]
The emphasis on LCC management is increasing and
industry is responding as evidenced by greater attention to
LCC in the preparation of unsolicited warranty proposals.
[Ref. 33]
5 . Early Commitment
Increased commitment is important but to derive the
full benefits of a successful LCC management effort, the
commitment must come early and be sustained throughout the
life of a program. Air Force Brigadier General J. W.
Stansberry commented that to avoid unnecessary expenditures
for support cost, life-cycle costing must be considered
early in the system acquisition process. [Ref. 40:p. 19]
There is ample evidence in the literature to sup-
port the conclusion that LCC must be considered early in
the acquisition process. Yet, each of the contractors in-
terviewed cited the need for earlier emphasis on LCC. [Ref. 41]
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The importance of early emphasis is highlighted by
the fact that 80 percent of life-cycle costs are associated
with the operating and support period of the life of a weap-
on system and 85-90 percent of the life-cycle costs are de-
termined by the end of the demonstration/validation phase.
[Ref. 35: p. 9]
Early commitment by the Government to an LCC manage-
ment strategy provides the contractor the incentive to con-
duct design trade-off studies during the early life of a
system when the greatest cost savings can be achieved. Dr.
John J. Bennett states that: "The greatest payoff, of
course, comes when supportability considerations are built
in early in the design process so that design considerations
can impact operating and support costs." [Ref. 42 :p. 2]
The Hardman Program Manager ' s LCC Handbook for Avionics
Equipment states that to have an impact on design, cost anal-
ysis must be carried out very early in the acquisition cycle
[Ref. 43 :p. 2], "For maximum impact, support concepts must
be addressed during the conceptual phase of design when the
basic approach to modularity and built-in testing and sensing
should be decided, and the logistics approach derived from
that point." [Ref. 43:p. 2]
Mr. O. C. Boileau pointed out that early emphasis on
LCC is important because of the impact the designer has on
the ultimate cost of a system.
Because the designer has a lot of leverage on the ultimate
cost of a product-affecting as much as 80 percent in some
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cases-a research and development program must be given
money and attention early. [Ref. 34:p. 7]
Early emphasis is important to make it clear to the
contractor that it is the express intention of the Government
to manage LCC. This fact is borne out by the observation
that many contractors find late in the process that the pro-
curing agency really intends to enforce the incentive provi-
sions of a contract. [Ref. 6:p. 150] The researcher would
conclude that although the Government has every legal right
to enforce the incentive provisions of a contract, doing so
late in the procurement process reduces any advantages which
might have evolved.
Early emphasis on LCC is necessary to demonstrate to
the. contractor that the Government is committed to managing
LCC and to allow logistics considerations to freely interact
with and influence system design. The earlier in the life
of a system that cost saving measures are incorporated, the
greater the resulting cost savings will be. The Military
Handbook for Life Cycle Cost in Navy Acquisition states: "To
be effective, acquisition life-cycle costing begins in con-
cept exploration and continues throughout the acquisition
process." [Ref. l:p. 9]
Industry recognizes that early consideration of LCC
is important but it also realizes that it is very difficult
to get design engineers, both Navy and industry, to consider
LCC. To bring attention to the problem, Lockheed has under-
taken an independent research and development effort to look
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at lessons learned during design to identify potential LCC
problems to engineers early in the process. [Ref. 44]
To concern indicated by industry is also a concern
of the Government.
Our reliability and maintainability engineers don't fully
understand the logistic process and before we can do a
proper job of reliability by design we must understand
the whole acquisition process including life-cycle
considerations. [Ref. 35:p. 4]
6 . Communications Between the End User and Industry
Communications between Navy program offices and in-
dustry is only half of the communications problem. The other
hald if the interface between industry and the end user. In-
dustry views open communications with the end user as vital
to the success of a program, particularly in the area of
support equipment, and views Government cutbacks in field
visits as being detrimental to a successful LCC management
program. [Ref. 44] The site or field visits can prove to
be valuable to both industry and the Government for a number
of reasons. Mr. A. T. Harcarik, Group Engineer, Support
Equipment Engineering for Lockheed, pointed out two very im-
portant reasons that site visits are important. Visits make
engineers more familiar with the fleet's requirements, and
problems being experienced in the field can be discussed di-
rectly with the source. He also observed that the visits
are beneficial to the Government in that they tend to make
the user aware of the availability and proper application of
support equipment.
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Until a few years ago, the Logistics Engineering De-
partment of Lockheed conducted site surveys for general sup-
port equipment. Some of the problems identified illustrate
the importance of the visits and the potential for increased
cost savings. The discrepancies listed on one survey are:
[Ref. 44]
* The fleet was unfamiliar with new general support
equipment ( GSE )
.
* Fleet suggestions were slow in getting implemented.
* The fleet was unable to repair old GSE due to a lack
of spares.
* Many GSE items were on the shelf and not being used
because their application was not known.
The procurement of aviation support equipment is an
expensive undertaking and to field equipment which is either
improperly utilized, or not utilized at all, severely de-
grades the cost effectiveness of the SE program.
Mr. Frank pointed out that communications with the
end user are useful in another aspect of LCC management.
[Ref. 33] He states that the operational command or end
user is an important element in the total LCC management ef-
fort in that they are the source of the data used to compute
operating and support costs. Their biggest contribution to
managing LCC is in providing reliable, factual data on a
timely basis.
7 . LCC Goals and Measurements
The lack of distinct, discretely defined LCC goals
and measurements is viewed by industry as an obstacle which
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is preventing the Navy from deriving the full benefits of an
LCC management program. A contractor for aviation support
equipment pointed out that no LCC goals had ever been estab-
lished for SE. [Ref. 33] A Navy ILS manager for the JVX
program, which is currently between DSARC milestones I and
IIj stated that no official LCC targets had been established
because at this point they could not be defined [Ref. 11].
The impact of LCC cost goals is further borne out by the
following:
Because it has not yet been possible to provide a contrac-
tual incentive for the entire LCC, the production cost
goal (from DTC or DTUPC) are often the sole cost consid-
eration in design. The contractor tries to decrease pro-
duction costs, even if LCC suffers. [Ref. 6:p. 233]
When setting goals the Navy should define the content
of the cost goal precisely and assure that all of its elements
are controllable by the contractor [Ref. 6:p. 226]. Further-
more:
Any contract that provides an LCC, RIW, or logistic sup-
port cost incentive must supply clear rules for measuring
such costs, definitions of the performance expected, and
a method of handling contingencies. [Ref. 6:p. 144]
A tracking, controlling and reporting procedure for the costs
of the design helps to assure the achievement of cost goals
and increases management's effectiveness in controlling costs.
The effectiveness of controlling costs depends upon a
knowledge of expected costs. Standards serve as measure-
ments which call attention to cost variations. Execu-
tives and supervisors become cost-conscious as they
become aware of results. This cost consciousness tends
to reduce costs and encourage economies in all phases
of business. [Ref. 45:p. 469]
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In designing for LCC, the designer is governed by-
three primary variables; equipment specification, maintenance-
use concept, and the LCC verification sampling plan. [Ref.
46 :p. 31] The same reference brings up the fact that to
gain a competitive edge, contractors closely examine the
measurement techniques which may be used to their advantage.
To win an LCC competition, the designer must attempt to
assess the sensitivities of the overall LCC model and,
as a subset of that consideration, particularly examine
any peculiarities of the sample use plan that will be
implemented to measure the apparent LCC. [Ref. 46:p. 31]
The researcher would conclude that to minimize "gaming" by
contractors, the Navy should fully understand any goals it
is imposing.
Specific problems which need to be addressed are
[Ref. 33]:
* LCC goals and requirements have not been included in
RFPs,
* LCC goals need to be near term, achievable and more
realistic,
* The data elements needed to track performance need to
be identified, and
* More reliable data collection techniques need to be
devised.
From the Government side, Mr. Frayer recognized that
to improve LCC management the requirements for performance,
reliability, maintainability, availability, and cost should
be correlated to be compatible. [Ref. 7:p. 39] He also
commented that the work breakdown structure used for LCC




8 . Data Base
The Government lacks the appropriate data from which
to develop LCC estimates and to analyze and track estimates
provided by industry. A 1974 GAO report found that LCC has
had limited application in decisions affecting major systems
acquisitions. The report cited the uncertainty of the data
used to develop estimates as a contributing factor. [Ref.
37:p. i] In 1976 a high Government official remarked that
both Government and industry are short on historical life-
cycle cost data [Ref. 7:p. 40]. The lack of an appropriate
data base is still a problem today. As expressed by Larry
Stahl, a Navy ILS manager:
The state of the art in aircraft cost estimating is
fairly well advanced when estimating the hardware
costs. As for the operating and support related and
other life-cycle costs, estimating is not very good
at all because of poor data collection and poor data
bases. [Ref. 11]
The lack of such a data base severely limits the
Navy's efforts to manage LCC. Much of the data required for
LCC management is developed during the Logistics Support
Analysis (LSA) and the Level of Repair Analysis (LORA), how-
ever, the three are not tied together. The data elements
need to be standardized and LCC models built to allow auto-
matic data inputs. [Ref. 33]
An incomplete data base, although making things diffi
cult, does not make managing LCC impossible. The Hardman
Program Manager's LCC Handbook supports this claim by point-
ing out that there is a tremendous amount of data available
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in the minds of the engineers who will design the system even
on the first day of a program. [Ref. 43 :p. 3]
The literature supports the conclusion that most cost
analysts believe that a reliable data base greatly enhances
the validity of LCC estimates even in the early stages of
procurement. [Ref. 37: p. 4] The same referenced GAO report
claims that shortcomings in methods of data accumulation
have hurt the credibility of LCC estimates.
9. Aviation Support Equipment
Some of the unique problems encountered in managing
LCC for ASE, as identified by support equipment contractors,
are [Ref. 44]:
* Delays in formalizing maintenance plans delay the sub-
mission of Support Equipment Requirements Documents
(SERDs)
.
* There is a lack of communications between programs to
identify SE being developed.
* Drawings in SERDs are not detailed enough to. support
competition.
* During SE design reviews DTUPC is emphasized, not DTLCC.
* There is no consistent application of contractual re-
quirements for LCC management on SE.
SERDs are technical documents prepared by the con-
tractor which identify the peculiar and common support equip-
ment required to support a system. Present requirements
state that SERDs do not have to be submitted until after the
maintenance plan is formally approved. [Ref. 44] Mr. Ed
Main, NAVAIR Support Equipment Logistics Management Division,
observed that SERDs may be dropped at any time--even one
month before the initial operating capability (IOC). This
creates problems for the contracting officer who is trying
to procure the system and the SPM-SE who is attempting to
manage LCC. SERDs are rarely submitted before full-scale
development. [Ref. 46]
It is important to consider support equipment re-
quirements early in the procurement process to avoid delays
in fielding the weapon system. This enables support require-
ments to interact with the engineering design thus minimizing
the PSE and total SE requirements. The importance of early
identification is recognized by the NAVAIR Support Equipment
Division, and is expressed in the foreword to the SE Selec-
tion Guide .
In addition, solutions to support requirements must be
reached as early as practicable in the prime system
development cycle, to ensure the timely acquisition
and operation of ATE to support those systems. [Ref.
13 :p. iii
]
DODD 5000.39 requires that support requirements will
interact with design. The effectiveness of this desired in-
teraction is minimized when maintenance plans are not formal-
ized until late in the program, long after the concept
exploration phase has been completed. The problems arising
from the late indentif ication of SE all tend to increase the
potential of reducing the operational availability of a sys-
tem through a lack of SE once it is fielded. The failure to
identify SE gives rise to several potential problems. As
discussed during interviews they are:
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* In order to meet the IOC and avoid schedule delays, PSE
must be purchased directly from the prime contractor.
* Due to limited time, the contracting officer frequently
can not allow the market forces of competition to work,
and is forced into a sole source position.
* Any cost savings which may have been derived from de-
sign tradeoffs during CE are eliminated. Once the
design is frozen, it is extremely difficult and ex-
pensive to change it. [Ref. 46]
The lack of communications between programs concern-
ing the development of SE creates the potential for funding
multiple development efforts for the same or similar piece
of SE. Although the Technical Information File, MILHNDBK
300, shows the applicability of support equipment to other
programs, it is not considered by industry engineers to be
current. [Ref. 44] Recognizing this, the FY85 Joint Logis-
tics Committee on the standardization of ASE, undertook the
task of updating the file. The task has since been completed,
[Ref. 19]
Competition is a very strong force, which when prop-
erly used, can reduce the cost of a system. Efforts to com-
plete SE are hindered by the fact the SERDs are not detailed
enough to support competition. [Ref. 44] More detailed
drawings will cost more and consequently, before considering
such an alternative, a cost benefit analysis should be con-
ducted to determine which approach will have the greatest
favorable impact on LCC.
The problem of emphasizing DTUPC during SE design
reviews as opposed to DTLCC was discussed earlier in this
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section. The inconsistent application of contractual re-
quirements for LCC management on SE was also previously-
discussed.
C. SUMMARY
Life-cycle cost estimates developed by both the Navy and
industry tend to be over optimistic. Navy PMs are prone to
be optimistic in their estimates to win program approval. If
the estimates will serve as budget inputs, the tendency is to
inflate them to provide a cushion for future contingencies.
Contractors on the other hand, will be optimistic with their
estimates in an effort to win the contract. Use of less than
realistic cost estimates has the potential of harming a pro-
gram by creating the appearance of cost overruns. Use of
estimates which are not realistic degrades the benefits to be
derived from an LCC management effort by establishing a less
than accurate baseline.
A well-structured RFP can be very beneficial to managing
LCC. Not only does the RFP provide the information to devel-
op estimates, but it also highlights those areas which will be
emphasized by the Navy. The problem arises from the fact
that the operational scenarios, environmental data and em-
ployment information needed to develop LCC estimates are
generally lacking from RFPs. As one of the first pieces of
formal correspondence with the contractor, the RFP sets the
tone for the entire project.
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The research shows that most contractors are of the
opinion that the Government is not fully committed to manag-
ing LCC. This is evidenced by a failure to include and prop-
erly emphasize the LCC management effort in the RFP, the fact
that PMs are evaluated based on the achievement of near term
goals and not long term supportability , and a lack of under-
standing of the benefits to be derived from LCC management.
It has been suggested that to increase the emphasis on LCC,
reliability, maintainability, operational availability, and
supportability should be elevated to the same status as per-
formance, schedule and UPC.
Placing an early emphasis on LCC is important not only
to demonstrate to the contractor the Navy's commitment, but
also to derive the greatest economic benefit. The design
engineer plays a vital role in determining the ultimate LCC
of a system. Eighty five to ninety percent of the life-cycle
costs are determined by the demonstration/validation phase.
From an industry perspective, it is not only important
to have a strong interface with the buying office, but with
the end user as well. This interface is viewed as particular-
ly important for support equipment. Site or field visits are
beneficial to both the contractor and the Navy. For the con-
tractor, the visits enable engineers to become more familiar
with the fleet's requirements and bring them closer to the
source of problems. The Navy benefits by having the contrac-
tor demonstrate the proper application of support equipment.
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The end user is the ultimate source for data pertaining to
operating and support costs. Their biggest contribution to
the LCC management effort is in providing reliable, factual
data on a timely basis.
The inclusion of LCC goals and thresholds in major sys-
tems contracts have been sporadic, and non-existent for ASE.
LCC goals and thresholds should be included in RFPs for com-
mon ASE. The goals need to be near term, achievable and more
realistic. Data elements need clarification and more relia-
ble collection techniques need to be devised.
The lack of an appropriate data base has made developing
in-house estimates and analyzing inputs very difficult. The
uncertainty of the data base has been advanced by some as a
reason for not developing LCC estimates at all. It is gener-
ally agreed that an accurate data base enhances any LCC man-
agement efforts. However, the literature will point out that
even without a data base there is still a great deal of data
available in the minds of design engineers.
The procurement of ASE creates some unique problems which
impact the LCC of a major system. Delays in the submission
of SERDs, lack of communications between programs, drawings
in SERDs which do not have enough detail to support competi-
tion, failure to emphasize contractual requirements for LCC
management on SE, all hinder efforts to manage and reduce
LCC. The failure to identify SE requirements early in the
life of a program has the potential of increasing the LCC of
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both the major system and the SE. To meet the IOC, PSE is
predominantly purchased direct from the prime contractor,
contracting officers are forced into sole source procurements
due to limited time, and any interaction between support re-
quirements and design is reduced
.
The next chapter will discuss some recommended solutions
and various ways of motivating the contractor to better man-
age LCC„
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VI. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF IMPROVING
LIFE-CYCLE COST MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter provided a discussion of the obsta-
cles to managing life-cycle cost which have been identified
by this research. This chapter continues the discussion by
identifying ways in which the Navy can overcome these
obstacles.
To overcome these obstacles, the research shows that the
Navy must:
* Commit itself to the management of LCC early in the
life of a system,
* Make the inclusion of LCC provisions mandatory for all
RFPs for major systems, subsystems and support
equipment,
* Provide sufficient information in RFPs to enable the
contractor to develop realistic estimates,
* Insist upon the use of realistic vice optimistic LCC
estimates, and
* Incentivize the contractor to manage LCC throughout the
life of a program.
The research also indicates that contractors can be moti-
vated to manage LCC by:
* Encouraging competition,
* The use of incentive fee contracts,
* The use of award fee contracts,
* Elevating LCC to the status of unit production cost
(UPC), schedule and performance and making LCC a
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mandatory source selection criteria, and
* Utilizing reliability improvement warranties.
B. DISCUSSION
1 . Early Commitment to LCC
There is a perception by industry that the Navy is
not fully committed to managing life-cycle cost and that not
enough emphasis is being placed on managing these costs ear-
ly in the life of a system [Ref. 11]. As was previously men-
tioned, management emphasis and commitment by both industry
and the Navy is an essential element of this undertaking. To
demonstrate the commitment to managing cost, the Navy needs
to develop and implement LCC management policies and proce-
dures and translate those requirements into contractual pro-
visions. [Ref. 7:p. 39] The use of contractual provisions
is a step towards making it clear to industry that the Navy
is intent on managing LCC. "The principal motivators are
competition and the knowledge that primary downstream cost
drivers, such as MTBF, are to be measured . . . ." [Ref. 10:
p. 377]
The mere inclusion of contractual provisions is not
in itself sufficient to motivate the contractor to manage
cost. To be effective they must be consistently applied
throughout the program. [Ref. 6: p. 150] As previously
stated, although the Navy has the legal right to enforce in-
centives at the end of contract performance, if progress to-
wards reaching desired goals is not monitored and managed
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throughout the life of the contract, any economic benefits
that may have come about will have been reduced or eliminated.
"If the contractor perceives a lack of credibility, policy
response will be reflective and fundamental changes will not
be implemented." [Ref. 36:p. 31] When design-to-cost was
first introduced, contractors believed that the emphasis and
importance attached to the program by the Government program
offices were primary motivating factors in organizational
response [Ref. 36:p. 16].
Inclusion of the requirement to develop a total cost
management plan and an LCC estimate in the RFP will emphasize
the Navy's commitment from the beginning of the program. As
the first formal contact with industry, the attitudes and
priorities expressed in the RFP will be mirrored in the con-
tractors' response.
Early inclusion of a cost management effort is impor-
tant to derive the full economic advantage [Ref. 42:p. 12].
The researcher would conclude that emphasis on life-cycle
cost creates an environment in which to be successful, the
contractor must conduct design trade-off studies during the
concept exploration phase where the greatest cost savings
can be realized. "Systems support and readiness is an atti-
tude, not a program, and the earlier it is considered in the
acquisition process the greater the cost-effectiveness lever-
age." [Ref. 47:p. 7] Interviews indicated that mandatory
inclusion of a total cost LCC management plan in the acquisi-
tion strategy is one means of assuring early commitment.
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[Ref. 11] The acquisition strategy is a communications tool
by which the program manager conveys his concerns for owner-
ship costs to the various supporting elements of the program
and thus sets the tone for future developments.
2 . Inclusion of Life-Cycle Cost in RFPs
Life-cycle cost requirements should be included in
all RFPs, not just those for major systems. The policy has
been written and the implementing instructions are in place
requiring the consideration of ownership costs throughout
the life of a major system. The intent of the regulatory
provisions is to apply to all procurements where managing
the total cost of ownership would be cost-effective and ben-
eficial to the Government. DoDD 4105.62, Selection of Con-
tractual Sources for Major Defense Systems, states: "The
principles established in this Directive also are applicable
to acquisitions other than those for major systems . . . ."
[Ref. 28:p. 1] Other Department of Defense policy documents
reiterate this position. [Ref. 26:p. 2] In particular LCC
goals, measurements and the establishment of an LCC manage-
ment plan should be included in each RFP for support equip-
ment and ultimately translated into contractual requirements,
The Hardman Program Managers' LCC Handbook for avi-
onics equipment contains an example of the wording which
might be included in all RFPs concerning total cost manage-
ment:
Life-cycle cost is considered to be the greatest concern
in the procurement. Proposed design approaches will not
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be considered solely on the basis of their acquisition cost,
but also on the likelihood that they will exhibit low oper-
ating and support cost. It is the Government's intention
to procure a design which economizes on all resources, both
current and future. To this end, minimization of the cost
of individual resources (e.g., manpower or support and test
equipment) is deemed unacceptable: instead the designer
shall accept responsibility for minimization of total life
cycle cost. This requirement shall be considered satis-
fied by the integration of life-cycle cost analysis in the
design process. Appended to this solicitation are all
materials required to carry out such analysis, as part of
the design process. While bidders are not required to
use these materials, they should recognize that the govern-
ment intends to use them in the source selection process
and that the requirement for their use shall be included
in any contract which may arise from this solicitation.
[Ref. 43:p. 3]
The sample RFP clearly states the Government's inten-
tion to manage cost. It places cost on a par with unit-pro-
duction cost, schedule and performance and requires that LCC
trade-off studies be conducted during the design process.
The RFP also makes it clear that the total cost of ownership
will be used as a source selection criterion and ultimately
included in any contract which may arise from the solicitation.
Special emphasis should be placed on the wording:
"appended to this solicitation are all materials required to
carry out such analysis . . . ." The RFP should contain suf-
ficient operational scenarios, environmental data and employ-
ment information from which to develop realistic estimates of
life-cycle cost and cost management plans.
3 . Information Contained in RFPs
The researcher would observe that many of the problems
with managing ownership costs can be overcome by a well-struc-
tured request for proposal which contains sufficient informa-
tion to develop realistic LCC plans and estimates. The RFP
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is the formal means by which information is conveyed to the
contractor from which he will develop these figures. The
quality or realism of those estimates is a direct reflection
of the information provided.
To be effective, the RFP should emphasize realistic
valuations, provide sufficient information from which to pre-
pare estimates and clearly define the LCC goals and measure-
ments which will be employed. [Ref. 33] One means of
increasing the viability of an RFP is to use pilot RFPs.
Government and industry would work together to identify the
total cost goals, measurements, the cost structure and the
LCC model to be used in developing plans and estimates prior
to formalizing the RFP. The advantages of such an approach
are:
* The costs which should be included would be better
defined,
* Specific problems with the LCC model could be identi-
fied and resolved prior to formalizing the RFP,
* The information required by industry to prepare the
estimates would be properly identified,
* Such an approach reduces the potential for problems
once the formal RFP is sent to industry, and
* Industry's understanding of what is required is in-
creased and consequently they are in a better position
to respond with realistic cost estimates and management
plans.
The DoD has recognized the potential of draft RFPs
and encourages their use. The current Directive on source
selection outlines the Government's position.
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The use of draft Requests for Proposal (RFPs) is encouraged
to obtain feedback from prospective offerors. Draft RFPs
should be as complete as possible, including a statement of
work, specifications, data requirements, evaluation criter-
ia, and general and specific provisions. Sufficient time
should be allowed to permit prospective offerors to respond
meaningfully. Feedback for consideration in preparing the
final RFP should include identification of cost drivers,
noncost-ef fective contract requirements, and any other
changes that would enhance the acquisition program by im-
proving system performance or by reducing life cycle costs.
[Ref. 15:p. 6-7]
One disadvantage that a PM or contracting officer
might point out is that the use of pilot RFPs will only
lengthen already stretched program schedules. It is the re-
searcher's view that the disputes avoided and the quality of
estimates provided will more than compensate for the extra
time spent.
4 . Realistic Vice Optimistic Estimates
Obtaining realistic estimates is not something that
can be mandated but rather something that will have to come
about as a result of the PM ' s better uderstanding of the
benefits and potential cost savings of an LCC management
program.
It appears that Navy efforts to obtain realistic
cost estimates are hindered by the structure of the bid pro-
cess itself.
At the outset of a program, our DoD bid process encourages
substantial contractor over optimism in technical accom-
plishment, in schedule, and in cost. The contractor en-
vironment is one of competition to win the support of the
evaluators of the proposal; thus the contractor very much
caters to the evaluator's interests. [Ref. 32:p. 4-35]
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This apparent dilemma is easily overcome by a demonstrated
commitment by the Government to obtain realistic estimates
and by verifying them with estimates developed in house. The
Navy Program Manager's Guide points out that total life-cycle
cost is a critical factor when evaluating a proposal and
that contractor's estimates should be verified by independent
estimates. It states:
Cost estimates in the earlier stages of the acquisition
process are far from precise, and independent estimates
of development and LCC by an in-house activity are needed
to establish a baseline against which to evaluate the
validity of contractor cost estimates. [Ref. 32:p. 4-40]
As was pointed out earlier, the Government's ability to ac-
curately estimate ownership costs is viewed by both industry
and the Government as being ineffective. [Ref. 33] It fol-
lows that if the Navy is going to motivate or incentivize
industry to submit realistic estimates, the Navy should have
the capability to determine the realism of those inputs. The
importance of independent estimates is reflected in the Di-
rective on source selection.
Independent cost estimates are necessary as a benchmark
against which to compare proposals cost estimates. The
realism of the offeror's proposal should be indicated by
a ranking relative to the Government's estimate. [Ref.
28:p. 8]
5 . Contractor Incentives to Manage Life-Cycle Cost
The program manager should motivate or incentivize
the contractor to invest company resources to manage the cost
of a system in a manner which is both cost-effective for the
Government and profitable for industry. The steps which a
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PM might follow are:
* Identify what factors influence the contractor's per-
formance,
* Establish realistic goals and measurement criteria to
measure a contractor's performance in designated moti-
vational areas, and
* Determine the best approach to motivate the contractor
to achieve the desired results.
The literature points out that performance may be
influenced by the following factors [Ref. 48:p. xxiii]:
* Contractor motivation for increased reliability,
* Government credibility for warranty success,
* Competitive environment,
* Ability to accurately predict field reliability, and
* Subsystem contracting environment.
The subsystem contracting environment is especially
important to managing LCC for support equipment. In many
cases the prime, acting as a systems integrator, will sub-
contract out for support equipment. For a cost management
program to be successful, the prime must be contractually
required to include LCC provisions in all subcontracts. Any
incentives or awards should also be passed on to the
subcontractors
.
The second step towards motivating the contractor is
to establish goals, targets, and requirements in those areas
which will influence the contractor's behavior which are re-
alistic and attainable. The establishment of realistic goals
and targets is greatly facilitated by the existence of an
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effective Government/ industry interface, and by the use of
realistic vice optimistic LCC estimates. Participation by
the contractor in the development of cost goals and targets
to be included in the RFP will tend to minimize the potential
for misunderstandings which can lead to schedule delays and
cost overruns. The contractor is bound by the terms of the
contract so it is important that both parties fully under-
stand the letter and the intent of the contract.
To establish achievable goals, it would be beneficial
if negotiators understood the various technical and cost ele-
ments and how they interact to result in the life-cycle cost
of a program. Assignment of goals which are either too high
or too low are counterproductive resulting in increased vice
decreased LCC.
The use of incentives that exceed the range of reasonable
expectation is wasteful of incentive effectiveness. Com-
mitments based on guestimation rather than on assessment
and experience are, at best, gambled contingencies and
facetious criteria for award. [Ref. 3:p. 32]
Some of the tools available to a contracting officer
to motivate the contractor to manage cost which are listed
throughout the literature include:
* Encouraging competition,
* The use of incentive fee contracts,
* The use of award fee contracts,
* Elevating LCC to the status of unit-production cost,
schedule and performance and making LCC a mandatory
source selection criterion, and
* Utilizing reliability improvement warranties.
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Each of the above mentioned approaches to motivating
a contractor work equally well for major systems, subsystems
and support equipment. To be fully effective, any incentives




Competition is a powerful tool which can be used
to encourage effective management of total cost. When the
market forces to support true competition exist and cost is
used as an evaluation criterion during source selection on
an equal basis with unit production cost, schedule and per-
formance the incentive is there for the contractor to manage
LCC from the beginning. An author stated: "Competition is
the most important factor in making LCC contract requirements
work easily." [Ref. 6:p. 153]
b. Incentive Fee Contracts
Incentive fees are defined in the Acquisition
Strategy Guide :
Defined, an incentive fee contract is a strategy to reward
the contractor for meeting or exceeding defined goals and,
in some cases, to penalize the contractor for failure to
meet goals. The objective of an incentive fee contract
is to motivate the contractor to meet or exceed target
levels when there is uncertainty about the outcome and
the contractor has some control of the outcome. [Ref.
17:p. 5-29]
The type of contract to use, whether it be a
cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) or a fixed-price-incentive-
fee (FPIF) contract is dependent upon the degree of uncertain-
ty. The CPIF contract is most appropriate when the
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uncertainties of performance preclude a fixed-price contract
but are not so great as to require a cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tract. The FPIF contract is more applicable to situations
where the goals are not easily quantified, such as in
management. [Ref. 17:p. 5-29]
The proper structuring of incentive arrangements
is important to avoid future disputes and to achieve the de-
sired results. Realizing that the contractor will concen-
trate on those areas where the incentives are the greatest,
it is important that the PM and contracting officer work to-
gether to structure the incentives which will accomplish the
desired objectives. [Ref. 6:p. 137]
The advantages of an incentive fee contract are
[Ref. 17:p. 5-30]:
* Greater realism in negotiating,
* Increased cost consciousness,
* Account for motivational variability, and
* Provide the contractor flexibility in meeting target
values.
Some disadvantages are [Ref. 17:p. 5-30]:
* The cost and complexity of administration are increased,
* It is difficult to establish realistic targets,
* There is a tendency to create incentives for too many
elements, leading to complex, poorly understood
relationships
,
* Contract complications arise from Government directed
changes, and
* The profit motive, the essence of incentive contracting,
may not be the prime motive of the contractor.
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A major subcontractor for aviation support equip-
ment commented that a disadvantage of an incentive fee ar-
rangement is that it automatically casts both the Government
and industry as adversaries. A by-product of this adversar-
ial position is the deterioration of the interface which is
so vital to the success of any program. [Ref. 33]
Another disadvantage to using incentive fees for
controlling cost is a perception by industry that a contrac-
tor will receive the full incentive regardless of whether the
goal is achieved or not. Two reasons given to support this
claim are: 1) to make anything less than a full award is
viewed by the program office as an admission of failure to
overcome a major problem, and 2) goals are difficult to
measure. [Ref. 11]
c. Award Fee Contracts
An award fee type of contract provides a means
of applying incentives in contracts which are not suscepti-
ble to finite measurements of performance necessary for
structuring incentive contracts. [Ref. 32:p. 41] An award
fee is particularly useful during the early phases of pro-
curement where the management effort of the contractor does
not lend itself to quantitative measurement.
The amount of award fee to be paid is based upon
a subjective evaluation by the Government of the quality of
the contractor's performance, judged in light of criteria
set forth in the contract. The intent of the criteria select-
ed should be in terms that express results rather than causes
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or kinds of effects. The criteria must be fully developed,
and the meaning and intent thoroughly understood by both
parties. If there is no agreement on the criteria to be used
or it is vague, the contractor will be confused trying to de-
termine where to allocate his resources to maximize profit.
[Ref. 32:pp. 41-42]
The advantages of an award fee contract are:
* Where firm, graduated, objective performance criteria
cannot be set before work begins, a cost-plus-award-
fee (CPAF) contract provides for subjective evaluation.
* A CPAF contract is flexible.
* Communication between the Government and the contractor
is greatly improved because there is a closer working
relationship than with other contract types. Further-
more, research has shown that contractor performance
improves with increasing top-level Government-contractor
interaction. [Ref. 49:p. 11]
* The award fee approach facilitates achievement of pro-
gram goals by its shared management requirements, and
by it's avoidance of the interposition on contractual
or other barriers between Government and contract
managers [Ref. 8:p. 1-12].
From an industry perspective the award fee con-
tract has the advantage of avoiding the inherent penalties
involved with an incentive fee arrangement. "With an award
fee the contractor either gets the award or he doesn't.
There is no loss or penalty for not achieving the goal."
[Ref. 33]
d. Life-Cycle Cost as a Mandatory Source
Selection Criterion
One approach to demonstrating to industry that
the Navy is committed to the early and continued management
98
of life-cycle cost is to make it a mandatory source selec-
tion criterion not only for major systems but subsystems
and support equipment as well. "The Government must con-
vince contract bidders that LCC is a significant considera-
tion in the selection of a contractor and in the continued
viability of the program." [Ref. 6:p. 252]
There is a perception by some that in the early
phases of procurement operating and support cost projects
are too uncertain to justify selection based on LCC. [Ref.
8:p. 2-8] The present feeling by industry is that this is
no longer true. Ownership cost is being used as a source
selection criterion and one contractor indicated that three
contracts had been won on the basis of these projections.
[Ref. 33]
Using life-cycle cost as a source selection
criteria is not a new idea however, it is one that has been
slow to catch on.
In March 1981, the Acquisition Improvement working
group suggested that reliability, maintainability,
operational availability, and supportability be ele-
vated to the status theretofore held by cost, schedule
and performance. This was not to diminish the impor-
tance of these latter criteria, but only to establish
the attention to the support disciplines, i.e., logis-
tics, reliability, maintainability, and quality assur-
ance, in order to enhance the overall operational
suitability of a fielded system. [Ref. 38:p. 132]
As discussed with one official, if the Navy is
going to use life-cycle cost as a source selection criterion
then the costs which should be included need to be better
defined [Ref. 11]. "Presently there is too much divergence,
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especially in the operating and support arena." [Ref. 11]
There is a consensus that each party should only estimate
those costs over which it exercises control. Those costs
which are inherently governmental , such as base operating
costs, should be estimated and incorporated into the indus-
try estimates by the Government. [Ref. 33]
The Navy should fund research and development
efforts to develop a standardized LCC model. The use of a
standard model would facilitate evaluation and comparison
of LCC proposals submitted and if centrally managed would
enhance the ability to update and refine the model to fur-
ther improve the accuracy of the estimates. The model does
not necessarily have to be perfect. If everyone uses the
same model there will be a consistency of errors. [Ref. 33]
e. Reliability Improvement Warranties
Mr. Michael P. Tucker explains that if the
Government expects the contractor to actively pursue the
reduction of operating and support costs then such an ef-
fort must be advantageous to the contractor. His views are
expressed in this quotation:
Clearly, arrangements need to be made to provide the
manufacturer with a stake in the operating and support
costs of the equipment. The production contractor
must see potential benefits to himself in lower oper-
ating and support costs before he is likely to change
design, adjust processes or take other actions enhanc-
ing reliability. Changes to traditional methods for
performing maintenance actions must also be effected
through new contractual concepts. [Ref. 50:p. 1]
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One method of creating an interest in operating
and support costs is by using a reliability improvement
warranty (RIW). "Under an RIW, a contractor assumes respon-
sibility on a fixed-price basis for repairing or replacing
(as he sees fit) warranted units that fail during the war-
ranted period." [Ref. 31:p. 1]
The use of such a warranty provides the contrac-
tor an economic incentive to reduce operating and support
cost. The impact of an RIW on these costs is expressed as
follows
:
The user generally attempts to hold down support costs by
specifying minimum acceptable reliability and maintain-
ability; but demonstration of these characteristics is
an inexact process, as is cost projection based on them.
In addition, the supplier is economically motivated to
reduce the level of equipment characteristics that are
basic determinants of support costs. However, in a
warranty procurement, the contractor is responsible for
virtually all repairs. A major portion of life-cycle
costs thus becomes his burden, and he is more inclined
to make higher initial outlays to assure reliability.
[Ref. 23:p. 621]
Defined, a warranty is an enforceable promise
given by a seller to a buyer that specifies the quality or
performance capability of a product or service [Ref. 51:p.
24]. A warranty may be implied or expressed and may be
classified as either a performance or design warranty which
are the two basic groupings of warranties used by the
Government.
The reliability improvement warranty (a perfor-
mance warranty), is a fixed-price contractual incentive for
improving operational reliability and maintainability. It
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requires that failures of the equipment during use be re-
paired at no charge to the Government for a specific period
of time, usually for a period of five years with a minimum
of three years.
Using an RIW places the responsibility for con-
trolling costs with the contractor who is in the best posi-
tion to control them. The objectives of an RIW are [Ref.
52:p. 7]:
* Improve reliability,
* Reduce life-cycle cost, and
* Shift the risk to the contractor.
The RIW also tends to increase the importance
placed on reliability in relation to performance, schedule
and initial cost by making it more profitable to consider
reliability than to neglect it.
Contractors who have been capable of designing and pro-
ducing reliable hardware, did not do so because their
rewards were realized from producing a high performance
system for the least possible cost and not from the
production of reliable equipment. [Ref. 50:p. 21]
The intent of an RIW is to motivate the contrac-
tor to design and produce equipment that will have a low
failure rate and be economical to repair when it does fail,
thereby reducing the life-cycle cost of the equipment to the
Government. [Ref. 49:p. 2-24]
The literature will support the claim that to
derive the maximum benefit from an RIW it is essential that
the decision to include it in the acquisition strategy be
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made early and that contractual provisions be included dur-
ing the concept exploration and design phases of the acqui-
sition process. It is during these phases that the
maintenance plan is formulated and design decisions which
will determine future operating and support costs are made.
"The designer determines reliability and can change it."
[Ref. 6:p. 204]
Once the design is set and production has begun
it is still possible to affect changes but it becomes in-
creasingly more expensive as time progresses.
Before deciding on a particular course of action
the program manager should carefully weigh the advantages,
disadvantages and experienced problems of each of the alter-
natives under consideration.
The advantages of an RIW include [Ref. 6:p. 141]:
* An RIW motivates the contractor to improve the initial
design for reliability and maintainability,
* Encourages the contractor to propose engineering changes
after the product is in the field so as to improve re-
liability and maintainability further and to reduce the
risk that repair costs, or the mean-time-between-failure
(MTBF) correction costs, will cause cost overruns,
* Provides for reduced customer investment in handbooks,
spares, test equipment, and maintenance training until
the item has stabilized,
* Provides an early explicit value for maintenance costs
for planning purposes,
* Provides an enforceable guarantee,
* Fosters, a closer working relationship between the con-
tractor and field operators, and
* Places a greater emphasis on LCC.
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From a contractor's viewpoint, an RIW provides
for increased profit potential if the MTBF is maintained
above the pricing base, provides for constant multi-year
business, and provides the opportunity for the contractor
to become more familiar with the operational reliability and
maintainability of his equipment which should help in ob-
taining follow-on contracts. [Ref. 53:p. 9]
Some of the disadvantages of an RIW are:
* RIWs may result in reduced military self-sufficiency
[Ref. 23: p. 28],
* Long term warranty provisions may present risks to
small companies that would discourage their entrance
into procurement competition [Ref. 53 :p. 10],
* Increased administrative complexity [Ref. 54:p. 26],
and
* It is difficult for contractors to predict their ulti-
mate field reliability and warranty cost due to lim-
ited development program data [Ref. 36: p. 9].
Mary Ann Gillece has identified four conditions
which will increase the effectiveness of a warranty. [Ref.
54:p. 26] They are:
* Warranties are best applied in a competitive environ-
ment
,
* Warranties work best when selectively applied to spe-
cific components rather than complete systems,
* The equipment should be well-defined and based on es-
tablished technology, and
* Warranties are best suited to fixed-price contracts.
Based on these criteria, the researcher would conclude that
warranties could be effectively applied to support equipment,
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In summary, the reliability improvement war-
ranty is a contractual tool which can be used to economical-
ly motivate the contractor to consider reliability and
maintainability. It places the responsibility for control-
ling costs with the contractor and makes it more profitable
for him to consider reliability than to neglect it. Final-
ly, the intent to use a warranty should be included early
in the life of the system to enable supportability require-
ments to influence the design.
C . SUMMARY
Life-cycle cost estimates developed by both the Navy and
industry tend to be over optimistic. Navy program managers
are prone to be optimistic in their estimtes to win program
approval. If they will serve as budget inputs, the tenden-
cy is to inflate them to provide a cushion for future con-
tingencies. Contractors on the other hand, will be optimistic
with their estimates in an effort to win the contract. Use
of less than realistic cost estimates has the potential of
harming a program by creating the appearance of cost overruns.
Use of estimates which are not realistic degrades the bene-
fits to be derived from a life-cycle cost management effort
by establishing a less than accurate baseline.
A well-established, functioning, Government/industry in-
terface is needed if the Navy is to be successful in manag-
ing life-cycle cost. The interface is presently characterized
as being less than effective.
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A well-structured request for proposal can be very bene-
ficial to managing ownership costs. Not only does it pro-
vide the information to develop estimates, but it also
highlights those areas which will be emphasized by the Navy.
The problem arises from the fact that the operational sce-
narios, environmental data and employment information needed
to develop cost estimates are generally lacking from RFPs.
As one of the first pieces of formal correspondence with the
contractor, the RFP sets the tone for the entire project.
The research shows that most contractors are of the
opinion that the Government is not fully committed to manag-
ing life-cycle cost. This is evidenced by a failure to in-
clude and properly emphasize the LCC management effort in
the RFP, the fact that program managers are evaluated based
on the achievement of near term goals and not long term
supportability , and a lack of understanding of the benefits
to be derived from total cost management. It has been sug-
gested, that to increase the emphasis on life-cycle cost,
reliability, maintainability, operational availability, and
supportability should be elevated to the same status as per-
formance, schedule and unit production cost.
Placing an early emphasis on cost is important not only
to demonstrate to the contractor the Navy's commitment, but
also to derive the greatest economic benefit. The design
engineer plays a vital role in determining the ultimate cost
of ownership of a system. Eighty five to ninety percent of
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these costs are determined by the demonstration/validation
phase.
From an industry perspective, it is not only important
to have a strong interface with the buying office but with
the end user as well. This interface is viewed as partic-
ularly important for support equipment. Site or field visits
are beneficial to both the contractor and the Navy. For the
contractor, the visits enable engineers to become more fa-
miliar with the fleet's requirements and bring them closer
to the source of problems. The Navy benefits by having the
contractor demonstrate the proper application of equipment.
The end user is the ultimate source for data pertaining to
operating and support costs. Their biggest contribution to
the cost management effort is in providing reliable, factual
data on a timely basis.
The inclusion of life-cycle cost goals and thresholds in
major systems contracts have been sporadic, and non-existent
for aviation support equipment. These goals and thresholds
should be included in RFPs for this equipment. The goals
need to be near term, achievable and more realistic. Data
elements need clarification and more reliable collection
techniques need to be devised.
The lack of an appropriate data base has made develop-
ing in-house estimates and analyzing inputs very difficult.
The uncertainty of the data base has been advanced by some
as a reason for not developing these estimates. It is
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generally agreed that an accurate data base enhances any
cost management efforts. However, the literature will point
out that even without a data base, there is still a great
deal of data available in the minds of design engineers.
The procurement of aviation support equipment creates
some unique problems which impact the total cost of owner-
ship of a major system. Delays in submission of Support
Equipment Recommendation Data ( SERDs ) which do not contain
enough detail to support competition, failure to emphasize
ownership costs during design reviews and an inconsistent
application of contractual requirements for life-cycle cost
management on support equipment, all hinder any efforts to
manage and reduce the total cost of ownership of both the
major system and the support equipment.
Each procurement will be different and will require a
slightly different approach to managing life-cycle cost.
The basics are the same though; life-cycle cost should re-
ceive early attention, be contractually required and moni-
tored throughout the life of a program.
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VII. NAVY PERSPECTIVE REGARDING THE PROBLEMS
AND ISSUES OF MANAGING LIFE-CYCLE COST
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will explore the problems and perceptions
concerning life-cycle cost management as seen by Navy pro-
gram managers of major weapon systems and by Navy Support
Equipment Acquisition Managers ( SEAMs )
.
To facilitate the discussion, the problems and issues
have been grouped in the following categories:
* Early commitment to managing life-cycle cost,
* Management emphasis on life-cycle cost,
* Life-cycle cost estimates,
* The life-cycle cost data base,
* Funding,
* Government/industry interface,
* Contractor incentives to manage LCC, and
* Positive life-cycle cost management.
B. DISCUSSION
1 . Early Commitment to Managing Life-Cycle Cost
The emphasis placed on LCC for both major systems
and support equipment will vary from program to program and
is dependent on the program manager and the phase of the
acquisition cycle the system is in. [Ref. 54] The majority
of interviewees were in agreement that LCC, and in particu-
lar operating and support costs, should be considered early
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in the design phase where the greatest payoff could occur.
[Ref. 54] This point is also supported by the literature.
"LCC procurement planning should begin early in the con-
tractual effort when the most advantageous procurement stra-
tegies can be adopted." [Ref. l:p. 20] One author states
that operating and support costs can be a major portion of
LCC and should not be over-shadowed by low procurement cost.
Operation and maintenance (O&M) costs (fuel, lubricants,
parts, labor, etc.) could amount to as much as 75 percent
of a piece of equipment's lifelong cost of ownership.
This gives rise to the concern that unless support costs
are given more than casual consideration, savings gener-
ated by low initial procurement costs may soon disappear
because of abnormal life-cycle support cost. [Ref. 55:
p. 15]
Although the operating and support costs can be a signifi-
cant portion of the LCC for a major system, one interviewee
pointed out that LCC design trade-offs do not receive as
much attention for support equipment because the associated
O&S costs are not as large a percentage of the total cost.
[Ref. 54] He further explained that the big cost drivers
such as fuel, lubricants and manning are generally not major
problems for SE. Maintenance would be the biggest cost
driver, particularly test and calibration. [Ref. 54]
A Navy cost analyst, while recognizing the need to
consider LCC during the early stages of the acquisition pro-
cess, pointed out that it is difficult to come up with real-
istic and reasonable estimates any earlier than the full
scale development phase. [Ref. 11] "Even in the earliest
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stages, estimates, however imprecise, can indicate which
system of several being considered would likely result in
the lowest ownership cost." [Ref. 37:p. 14]
There is general agreement between those interviewed
and the literature, that LCC should be considered early in
the life of a program when the greatest economic benefits
may be derived. Due to the fact that O&S costs for support
equipment are typically not as large a percentage of the
total cost as those for a major system, design trade-offs
are not as heavily emphasized. Finally, life-cycle cost
estimates even in the early stages of procurement, can be
beneficial to the decision making process.
2 . Management Emphasis on Life-Cycle Cost
The program manager (PM) plays a very important role
in determining to what extent LCC will influence a program.
As many PMs and Business Financial Managers ( BFMs ) will
point out, the emphasis is on current expenditures and not
on long term operating and support costs. [Ref. 56] The
Many participants are pushed by time to achieve something
significant in their tours and terms and, if it is
necessary to choose between satisfying a current or future
need, to decide in favor of the current one. [Ref. 8:
p. 3-1]
literature highlights the fact that a PM is judged on pro-
gram progress in the near term. "This environment encourag-
es program managers to regard their systems as unique and
discourages such things as hardware standardization and con-
cern for follow-on support." [Ref. 4:p. 32] Such a philos-
ophy does not appear to be in keeping with DoD's policy of
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obtaining affordable weapon systems. Affordability is de-
fined in A-109 as "a function of cost, priority, and avail-
ability of fiscal and manpower resources «,.„." [Ref. 26:
p. 6]
The attitudes of senior Navy officials to a large
degree determine what areas are to be emphasized in a pro-
gram. One BFM commented that no LCC requirements had been
imposed on the program manager and that little or no empha-
sis was placed on LCC for his particular project. This ap-
proach appears to be contrary to DoD policy. As declared
in DoDD 4245.3, it is the policy of the DoD to establish
O&S parameters [Ref. 15:p. 1] and that PMs shall identify
major life-cycle cost drivers and endeavor to contain them
during contract performance. [Ref. 15: p. 4]
Even when requirements for total cost are imposed,
there is concern by some that the emphasis is not genuine.
"Senior Navy officials are more concerned with statuatory
requirements than the impact of LCC on programs or budgets."
[Ref. 56] Looking at the issue from a different perspec-
tive, one official raised the question; "What decisions are
going to be changed?" [Ref. 57] Of those interviewed, the
most common response was that a program would not be can-
celled because of high anticipated ownership costs. [Ref.
56] A PM for a major system commented:
There is a great deal of emphasis being placed on LCC at
DSARC Milestones I and II. LCC estimates are being used
for comparison purposes to select the most cost effective
system. However, a program would not be cancelled due to
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an LCC estimate which was out of sight. The operational
requirement would override. [Ref. 56]
The same sentiments were expressed by a senior official in
the Support Equipment Division of NAVAIR. It was stated
that upfront costs were the deciding factor and high down-
stream costs would not be cause to cancel a program. [Ref.
58]
Just as the PMs for major systems tend to question
the real importance of LCC in the decision making process,
the SEAMs also question the role which LCC plays in the
selection of support equipment. One interviewee didn't know
if the selection of a particular piece of support equipment
was based on total cost, however, he did know from experience
that life-cycle cost was not a factor during negotiations.
[Ref. 59] An official in the Guidance and Control Section
of the Support Equipment Division remarked that LCC is in-
cluded in the selection process only so managers will be
aware of them [Ref. 58]. Still another manager in the Avi-
onics Section remarked that although the LICA was performed
by NAEC there wasn't much emphasis placed on the results
during the selection process [Ref. 60], It was also stated
that LCC estimates were not used during DNSARC reviews [Ref.
60].
As defined earlier, the Life Impact Cost Analysis
(LICA) is a modeling effort to determine the lifetime sup-
port costs of any Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) decision.
The SE Selection Guide does not place any restrictions on
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the use of LICA, yet in interviews with SEAMs it was stated
that it is only being applied to major items of ATE. [Ref.
21] It was also stated that the usefulness of this analysis
was further degraded by it being conducted too late in the
process. In come cases, the analysis was performed after
the selection had been made. [Ref. 21]
Of the program managers for major systems inter-
viewed, all agreed that LCC should be considered for major
systems [Ref. 57]. The literature also supports the claim
and contends that the use of LCC, or segments of it, in
procurement is an effective way to manage total system or
equipment cost [Ref. l:p. 20]. Furthermore:
From a fiscal perspective, the LCC process as applied to
an investment opportunity means that alternative courses
of action are considered before a set of options is
selected. The point to be made is that the total cost,
not just the initial near term costs, should be con-
sidered as an input to the decision process. [Ref. 1:
p. 8]
The SEAMs interviewed had differing opinions as to
how much emphasis should be placed on ownership costs.
There was concern over whether it was cost effective to do
a total cost analysis, and if the analysis was done, what
decisions would be affected. [Ref. 57] Not as much empha-
sis is being placed on LCC trade-off studies for SE due to
a belief that the large cost savings possible for major sys-
tems are not possible for SE [Ref. 21].
To summarize, the present emphasis by Navy managers
is on current expenditures vice long term operating and
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support costs. Those interviewed were in agreement that a
program would not be cancelled due to high anticipated O&S
costs. Interviewees in the Support Equipment Division
echoed these sentiments and added that it may not be cost
effective to do trade-off studies in all cases.
3 . Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
The uncertainty of LCC estimates is occasionally
advanced as a reason for not estimating them at all [Ref.
6:p. 67]. When Navy interviewees were asked how accurate
these estimates were and how this would be known, the most
frequent response was that there was no way of determining
their accuracy [Ref. 61]. A Navy cost analyst went further
and claimed that the inability to substantiate estimates is
a major problem. "When it comes to make cuts in a program,
if you can't prove or substantiate your figures, you are
going to get out." [Ref. 11] As pointed out by this same
individual, being able to substantiate estimates is essen-
tial not only to justify what you need, but also to justify
what will happen if you don't get the funding [Ref. 11].
During interviews and in reviewing the literature,
a number of explanations were offered to account for the
apparent uncertainty in estimates. The most prevelant re-
plies were:
* Both Government and industry are short on accountable
historical life-cycle cost data [Ref. 7:p. 40],
* The amount of time needed to field a new system adds
to the uncertainty [Ref. 8:p. 3-1],
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* Cost models and techniques being used are ineffective
[Ref. 37:p. i],
* It is difficult to estimate LCC for state-of-the-art
technology [Ref. 11],
* Program offices do not provide sufficient information
from which to develop reliable estimates [Ref. 11],
* It is difficult to separate recurring and non-recurring
costs [Ref. 21], and
* There is no interface between the Navy and industry
concerning LCC estimates [Ref. 57].
The necessity for the Government to be able to de-
velop realistic estimates is highlited in the DoD Directive
on source selection. It is explained that independent es-
timates serve as a means of determining the cost realism of
proposals submitted and as a benchmark against which to com-
pare proposal cost estimates. [Ref. 28:p. 8]
Interviewees for both major systems and SE stated
that contractors were providing LCC estimates and updates
however, they were not being analyzed. [Ref. 62] Some
questions which might be raised here are: If the Navy is
requiring and receiving LCC estimates and not using them,
why are they required? Another question is why haven't
the estimates been analyzed? An insufficient cost data base
is probably one reason the estimates can't be analyzed but
it is not the only one. Other explanation offered are:
* There is no commonly accepted work breakdown structure
for Integrated Logistics Support ( ILS )
,
* Each contractor will more than likely use a different
estimating model, and
* Each contractor will classify various costs as he
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thinks they should be classified which may or may not
be consistent with the request for proposal. [Ref. 11]
To resolve the problem of varying models, one might
conclude that a specific model should be called for in the
RFP. As Captain Vigrass (NAVAIR Cost Estimating) points
out, such an approach could be risky for the Navy because
any problems which might arise relative to the model or the
estimates, could be construed as being the responsibility
of the Navy. [Ref. 21]
This section has put forth the idea that life-cycle
cost estimates are shrouded in uncertainty. The necessity
for the Government to be able to develop realistic estimates
was pointed out and it was stated that those estimates and
updates provided by the contractor are not being used.
4. Cost Data Base
A 1974 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, con-
cerning life-cycle cost estimating, claimed that LCC has
had limited applications in decisions affecting major sys-
tems acquisition [Ref. 37:p. i]. The reasons given were
the uncertainty of the data used to develop estimates and
a need for better cost models and estimating techniques.
One of the recommendations given in the report was to im-
prove the data used in developing LCC estimates. [Ref. 37:
p. i ]
Almost eleven years later the cost data base for
life-cycle cost is still considered by some to be inadequate
[Ref. 11]. Captain Vigrass does not share this opinion.
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As he pointed out, there is currently in place a system to
collect historical operating and support cost data. The
system, referred to as VAMOSC (Visibility and Management of
Operating and Support Costs), contains historical cost data
which is readily available and easy to use. Captain Vigrass
is quick to point out though, that the validity of the data
base is dependent upon the quality of information input in-
to the system. [Ref. 54]
On the other hand, a Navy cost analyst still con-
tends that poor data collection and poor data bases are
inhibiting efforts to estimate ownership costs. This in-
terviewee agrees with the statement that the data base is
only as reliable as the information input and cites several
factors which tend to degrade the cost data base. The dif-
ficulties mentioned are:
* Each NARF (Naval Air Rework Facility) has a different
standard of work measurement,
* Measurement of time is not the same between NARFs , and
* The manner in which costs are allocated to a particu-
lar job differs between NARFs. [Ref. 11]
As was discussed in an earlier chapter, one industry execu-
tive felt that the biggest contribution an operational com-
mand or end user could make would be to provide reliable,
factual data on a timely basis [Ref. 33].
There is no difference of opinion concerning the
historical cost data base for aviation support equipment
(ASE). All those interviewed agreed that there was no such
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data base for SE and the lack of it was impairing the abili-
ty to estimate and analyze LCC. [Ref. 62] As Captain
Vigrass mentioned: "There is a need for good, accurate data
which is readily available. Not only is the cost data need-
ed but the technical data to describe the cost is needed as
well." [Ref. 21]
The reasons given to support the claim that a his-
torical cost data base is needed were the same for both ma-
jor systems and support equipment. Cost data bases are
needed to develop and refine cost estimating relationships
(CERs) used to determine ownership costs. As stated by a
Navy official: "A historical data base would not be useful
for analogies because it rarely works. However, the use of
such a data base would be beneficial in developing CERs."
[Ref. 60] Historical cost data bases are an additional tool
which may be used by the Navy to validate contractor pro-
vided estimates. The necessity for independent estimates
was expressed by:
To use LCC as a real factor in source selection with the
objective of incentivizing contractor emphasis in the
design phase . . . there must be follow-up procedures to
validate initial contractor estimates and an independent
assessment of estimates. [Ref. 63:p. 14]
Program Manager and cost analyst interviewees, men-
tioned that data collection is expensive and it may not be
cost effective to pursue in all cases [Ref. 21]. A cost
reducing alternative would be to collect data only on cer-
tain high value parts [Ref. 37:p. 7]. A 1974 GAO report on
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cost estimating states: "An OSD official . . . estimated
that about 80 percent of the depot maintenance cost is as-
sociated with about 15 percent of a systems components."
[Ref. 37:p. 7] Another approach offered by an aerospace
ILS manager would be to limit the number of aircraft for
which cost data would be collected [Ref. 33].
In summary, the need for a reliable cost data base
for both major systems and aviation support equipment, has
been recognized for a number of years. There is a system
currently in place to collect O&S cost data for major sys-
tems however, the credibility of the data is questioned by
some. There is no such data base for support equipment.
Historical cost data bases are needed to develop and refine
CERs and to aid in validating contractor provided estimates.
Due to the cost associated with data collection it may not
be economically feasible to collect data for an entire sys-
tem. Alternatives offered are collecting data for high
cost items or limiting the sample population.
5 . Funding
In addition to the difficulties encountered in es-
timating total cost, funding constraints have seriously
hampered efforts to manage cost for both major systems and
support equipment [Ref. 60]. Funding constraints in the
early years of a program [Ref. 2:p.36] and the fact that
Congress votes separate appropriations for procurement funds
and operating and maintenance funds [Ref. 4: p. 32] have been
identified as drawbacks to effectively managing LCC.
120
The lack of adequate up-front funding limits the
amount of design trade-off studies which may be conducted.
Testability has been cited by some as being one method of
reducing SE costs. The problem arises from the fact that
efforts to improve testability and performance have not
been separately funded, and when faced with a budget crunch,
funds earmarked for testability were expended to meet per-
formance requirements. [Ref. 58] A SEAM remarked:
On almost all of the programs, there have been problems
in achieving performance. Funds allotted for testa-
bility are subsequently expended to achieve performance
goals. Testability is not funded separately. [Ref. 58]
High initial costs requried to achieve total cost
savings may also restrict the number of alternatives to
those which can be achieved within available funds [Ref. 58]
The alternative selected may or may not have the lowest pro-
jected cost. This means that the system with the lowest
ownership cost may be eliminated from the competition.
This brings up a point which was made earlier. Accurate LCC
estimates are needed to justify up-front funds and to iden-
tify the consequences if such funds are not made available.
[Ref. 11]
The lack of funds, coupled with the PM ' s need to
meet near term goals, forces him to consider near term ex-
penditures often at the expense of future operating and sup-
port costs. A Navy ILS manager for a major system echoed
these sentiments. He states that when the budget crunch
came, the PM dropped all ILS incentives and deferred funding
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most of these incentives to the first production year.
[Ref. 11] Another program manager for a program which was
experiencing a funding shortfall, cut the data requirement
needed for future logistics support [Ref. 4:p. 32]. Per-
haps the reason for this is that Congress funds procurement
and operating and support costs separately [Ref. 6:p. 4],
This, linked with the focus of attention of senior Navy
officials on current expenditures vice long term operating
and support costs, causes the PM to give priority to pro-
curement costs [Ref. 56]. As expressed by an official work-
ing on the Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS):
"The focus is on current dollar, R&D and production, not
operating and support." [Ref. 60]
Insufficient up-front funding to support LCC design
trade-off studies appears to undermine the objective of the
DoD to obtain affordable systems. As stressed in DoD Di-
rectives, "A cost effective balance must be achieved among
acquisition costs, ownership costs of major systems, and
system effectiveness in terms of the mission to be performed."
[Ref. 26: p. 3]
A synopsis of the funding problem reveals that a
lack of up-front funding to conduct design trade-off studies
may be increasing the total cost of a system by neglecting
logistics considerations early in the life of a system.
Limited funding may also eliminate alternatives which, over
the life-cycle of a system, may be the most effective in




In a previous chapter, it was pointed out that the
Government/ industry interface concerning LCC management was
characterized as being less than effective. As previously
quoted, Mr. Frank of Litton Guidance and Control Section,
stated during an interview that the company was not aware
of how NAVAIR was organized to handle or develop LCC esti-
mates, it was not known how the estimates were used, and
his company had received no feedback concerning the esti-
mates or updates submitted. [Ref. 33]
When Navy officials were asked to characterize the
interface some of the responses given were:
* There is no Government/industry interface [Ref. 58],
* There is little interface with the contractor [Ref. 21],
and
* There is no interface with industry except at the de-
brief after the contract has been awarded [Ref. 57].
This researcher has observed that although industry
representatives were supportive of a strong interface, Navy
officials, although generally agreeing that the interface
should exist, were not as positive about their position.
7
.
Contractor Incentives to Manage Life-Cycle Cost
When asked the question how the contractor can be
motivated to manage LCC, a typical response was: "By im-
posing reliability and maintainability thesholds on the con-
tractor." [Ref. 59] One support equipment aquisition man-
ager claimed that while LCC is not specifically called for
in solicitations, the contractor is being motivated to
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control it by including reliability, maintainability and
supportability goals in the solicitation [Ref. 59 ]. Al-
though reliability and maintainability are only subsets of
the total cost of ownership, they determine the largest part
of the operating costs. Control over both of them minimizes
cost [Ref. 6:p. 237].
The inclusion of reliability and maintainability
requirements is also in keeping with DoDD 4245.3, Design to
Cost. This Directive calls for the establishment of DTC
parameters for O&S such as "unit operating crew and mainte-
nance manpower requirements or operational and logistics
reliability and maintainability . . . . " [Ref. 15:p. 3]
Another common reply was that the contractor is
motivated to consider LCC due to competition. In the words
of a major system PM: "The primary contractor motivation
is competition and the use of LCC as a source selection cri-
terion." [Ref. 56] He further claimed that competition as
a motivational tool was working.
8 . Applications of Life-Cycle Cost Management
Life-cycle cost management is not being totally neg-
lected by the Navy on either major systems or support equip-
ment. Two major programs which have had a great deal of
emphasis placed on total cost are the JVX (or V22) and CASS
(Consolidated Automated Support System).
As stated by Colonel Creech, the Program Manager for
the JVX: "There is a great deal of emphasis being placed on
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LCC considerations." [Ref. 64] To help cultivate design
trade-offs to enhance supportability , the management effort
for the JVX is structured so that the Logistics Element Man-
ager (LEM) must sign all engineering drawings. The cost
estimating team for the JVX is also compiling a lessons
learned package detailing the LCC management effort under-
taken. [Ref. 64] Larry Stahl, a Navy ILS manager working
on the JVX program, pointed out that LCC teams differ from
project to project. As a result, there is a lack of cor-
porate knowledge needed to avoid previous pitfalls. [Ref.
11] He views the maintenance of a lessons learned package
as being a very valuable means of capturing the knowledge
gained from experience.
The necessity of a lessons learned package is al-
luded to in the Design to Cost Directive. It states that
"DTC efforts . . . shall provide an audit trail of the im-
pact of these changes on DTC parameters." [Ref. 15: p. 2]
In the realm of aviation support equipment, there is
a great deal of emphasis being placed on managing ownership
costs for CASS [Ref. 60]. Early efforts to manage LCC in-
cluded the requirement that unlimited data and rights be
given the Government for the system. The objective is to
develop a reprocurement package to support future competi-
tion through breakout which could reduce LCC. Cost analyst
Bill Woodbury, remarked that the system is being designed
from the beginning to enhance supportability. [Ref. 62]
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The contractor is required to manage LCC as described in the
Statement of Work (SOW). It states that the primary cri-
terion for evaluating design changes during design reviews
is life-cycle cost. Furthermore, the contractor is required
to consider the impact of any proposed changes on life-cycle
cost. [Ref. 60]
The emphasis placed on LCC for the CASS program is
evident at all levels of the chain of command. This is re-
flected by the comment that at the next major milestone, LCC
and supportability will be given the same emphasis as tech-
nical requirements. [Ref. 60]
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has explored the major life-cycle cost is-
sues as presented by Government interviewees. It was stated
that life-cycle costs should be considered early in the ac-
quisition process when design trade-off studies can be con-
ducted to identify the most cost effective alternatives.
Although LCC should be considered early, LCC management ef-
forts are hampered by a lack of funding and insufficient
data bases. The lack of up-front funding creates an environ-
ment where the emphasis is placed on current expenditures,
often at the expense of future logistics support costs.
Historical cost data bases which either do not exist, or
contain questionable data, complicate Navy efforts to develop
independent estimates or analyze LCC estimates provided by
the contractor. In many cases, estimates provided by the
contractor were not evaluated.
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It was pointed out that the uncertainty of the LCC esti-
mates is often cited as a reason for not developing them at
all. However, it should again be stressed, LCC estimates
are essential to support budget requests. Various factors
contributing to the uncertainty of LCC estimates include in-
sufficient data bases, lack of funding, a lengthy procure-
ment process, lack of information, difficulty in
distinguishing recurring and non-recurring costs and an in-
effective interface with industry.
On the positive side, life-cycle cost is receiving man-
agement attention in some areas. Both the JVX and CASS
Programs have had a great deal of emphasis devoted to this
area. Each program has undertaken initiatives to enhance
the probability of reducing future O&S costs. The JVX pro-
gram has given the logistics element manager the opportunity
to review and sign engineering drawings. CASS is planning
for reduced LCC through the use of a reprocurement data
package to support competitive breakout of parts.
Perhaps the most important step which has been taken to
improve the LCC management process is the development of an
LCC lessons learned package by the JVX management team.
Such an effort could be very useful on future programs.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Life-cycle costs must be considered early in the acqui-
sition process when support considerations can still influ-
ence systems design . The views of both Navy officials and
representatives of the aerospace industry expressed in Chap-
ters V and VII support this contention. Support equipment
requirements, which may constitute 10 to 50 percent of the
cost of the prime equipment, are identified too late in the
procurement cycle to affect the design of the major system
and too close to the initial operational capability to per-
mit procuring the item in the most effective way. As point-
ed out in Chapter VII, design trade-offs are not heavily
emphasized for aviation support equipment.
Navy program managers are not fully committed to manag-
ing life-cycle costs . This position is supported by pub-
lished works and by interviews with program managers and
acquisition managers for aviation support equipment. This
is due primarily to the fact that PMs are evaluated on the
basis of current expenditures and not on long term operating
and support costs. Contributing to the problem is the fact
that procurement and support costs are funded separately.
Managers are not willing to sacrifice procurement dollars to
enhance long term supportability . The problem is particularly
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accute for support equipment where, as discussed in Chapter
VII, there has been little or no emphasis placed on life-
cycle cost with the exception of automatic test equipment.
The regulatory framework concerning the management and
control of the ownership costs of a major system is well-
established, but the policies are not being consistently
applied . As discussed in Chapter IV, the Directives empha-
size the importance of managing cost throughout the life of
a system. However, the policies and procedures are not con-
sistently followed and there is little evidence that the
provisions of the Directives are being applied to aviation
support equipment. The emphasis continues to be placed on
unit-production cost vice, a balance between total cost,
unit-production cost, schedule and performance. Provisions
for managing ownership costs which are included but are be-
ing inconsistently applied are:
* Cost is defined as the total cost of ownership, not
unit-production cost,
* LCC management should be included in the acquisition
strategy and emphasized during concept exploration,
* Independent cost estimates should be used where feasi-
ble for comparison purposes and to determine cost
realism, and
* Appropriate trade-offs among investment costs, owner-
ship costs, schedules and performance should be
conducted.
The Government/industry interface relative to managing
ownership costs is ineffective . Industry and Navy repre-
sentatives both agree that the Government/ industry interface
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is ineffective. This conclusion is supported in Chapters V
and VII. While industry appears to be very anxious to im-
prove communications , those Navy interviewees did not seem
to share their enthusiasm. When estimates are provided by
the contractor, the Navy is not providing any feedback to
the contractor as to their validity or for what purposes the
estimates are being used.
Requests for proposals do not contain adequate program
information to facilitate the development of life-cycle cost
estimates, by either Government or industry cost analysts,
and attention to ownership costs is not adequate . Industry
and Government representatives, as discussed in Chapters V,
VI, and VII, have characterized RFPs as being vague with re-
gards to LCC, lacking of LCC goals and management require-
ments and containing insufficient program information to
develop meaningful estimates. Information which has been
identified as insufficient includes operational scenarios,
employment information and environmental data.
Provisions to monitor the total cost of a system have
been lacking from requests for proposals for aviation sup-
port equipment . The necessity of managing life-cycle costs
for major weapon systems is equally applicable to aviation
support equipment. Yet, as discussed in Chapter V the re-
quirements are not being consistently applied.
The validity of life-cycle cost estimates prepared by
the Navy is questionable . Navy cost analysts for major
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systems must rely on the historical cost data contained in
VAMOSC to develop their estimates. The reliability of this
data is only as good as the quality of the input, which
varies between activities. Analysts for aviation support
equipment have no such data base to work with. Furthermore,
program managers tend to be optimistic in their estimates of
life-cycle cost to ensure the survival of their program.
When used to prepare budgets, ownership costs are inflated
to provide a cushion for future contingencies.
The ability to develop accurate life-cycle cost projec-
tions for aviation support equipment is hindered by the non-
existence of a historical data base for operating and support
costs . Navy managers agree that while there is a system for
collecting operating and support cost data for major systems
no such system exists for aviation support equipment. The
lack of this information impairs the ability of a cost ana-
lyst to develop LCC estimates and to evaluate estimates pro-
vided by the contractor.
It is the policy of the DoD to procure affordable systems .
This is equally applicable to both major systems and aviation
support equipment. This position is supported in Chapters IV,
V, and VII. While the Directives and Instructions were writ-
ten to cover the procurement of major systems , many specifical-
ly state that the policies and provisions are equally
applicable to less than major systems.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The management principles, goals and objectives contained
in DoD Directives pertaining to major systems acquisition
should be applied to aviation support equipment . As explained
in DoDD 5000.1, the management principles and objectives de-
scribed therein shall also be applied to the acquisition of
defense systems not designated as major, e.g., aviation sup-
port equipment. Training should be conducted within the Sup-
port Equipment Division to familiarize personnel at all levels
with the policies concerning, and the benefits to be derived
from life-cycle cost management. Life-cycle cost should be-
come as familiar a phrase as competition or reliability and
maintainability. The commitment to control cost must start
at the top. When reviewing decisions senior officials should
insist on reviewing the cost trade-off analysis which was
conducted.
The provisions of the SE Selection Guide should be ex-
panded to include all aviation support equipment . The pro-
cedures followed in selecting automatic test equipment are
based on sound business principles and are applicable to all
items of aviation support equipment. Realizing that not all
procurements can benefit from a life-cycle cost analysis, a
dollar threshold should be established below which it would
not be economically feasible to pursue extensive LCC manage-
ment efforts. At a minimum, a life impact cost analysis
(LICA), or some abbreviated form of a LICA, should be per-
formed for each procurement. The LICA should be given more
than a cursory review when making the final selection.
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The Navy should emphasize realistic vice optimistic esti-
mates . It is pointed out in Chapter VI that although initial
estimtes are far from precise, they are still needed to es-
tablish a cost baseline. Furthermore, the failure to use
realistic cost estimates may do harm to a program by creating
the appearance of cost overruns. Independent Government es-
timates should be developed and compared with industry esti-
mates to determine cost realism. Initial estimates should
be monitored and refined as more data become available. To
do this, a reliable system is needed to collect O&S cost data
for both major systems and ASE. The regulatory framework to
implement this recommendation is already included in current
DoD Directives and in the SE Selection Guide.
A cost data base for operating and support costs contain-
ing not only cost data but the related technical data, must
be developed for aviation support equipment . If costs are to
be accurately estimated, then a data base is needed to develop
cost estimating relationships and to substantiate estimates
prepared by Navy and industry cost analysts. The ability to
accurately estimate life-cycle costs will go a long way to-
wards convincing Congress of the economic advantages of man-
aging LCC early in the life of a program. Further research
should be conducted to determine the feasibility of incorpor-
ating support equipment into the VAMOSC system.
To demonstrate the Navy's commitment to managing life-
cycle cost, it should be given the same status held by unit
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production cost, schedule and performance and made a manda-
tory source selection criterion . It has been stated that
the RFP establishes the goals and objectives which will be
given priority throughout the procurement process. RFPs
should be worded in such a manner that there is no mistake
that life-cycle cost will be weighted equally with unit-
production cost, schedule and performance during the source
selection process. This action will force contractors to
seek a balance among the four elements just mentioned if
they are to be successful in their efforts to win the award.
The Government/industry interface pertaining to life-
cycle cost management needs to be strengthened . A weak in-
terface impairs the Government's ability to accurately
determine and manage the total cost of a system. Industry
has a wealth of knowledge concerning cost management which,
when shared with the Government through open communications,
can result in cost savings for both parties. One means of
improving this interface is through the increased use of
draft RFPs. Contractor field visits should be reinstated and
funded to improve the interface with the end user. In addi-
tion when a contractor provides estimates he should be pro-
vided a copy of the analysis performed by the Government to
enable him to refine his cost model or identify discrepancies
in the analysis.
Requests for proposals must contain sufficient informa-
tion to permit the development of reliable cost estimates .
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The intent to manage life-cycle cost must be clearly stated
in the RFP. Goals and thresholds should be included and.
they must be realistic, near term, and achievable. The data
elements needed to track performance must be identified and
then costs monitored throughout the life of a system. In-
formation currently lacking from RFPs are adequate operation-
al scenarios, environmental data, and employment information.
Without this information cost estimates developed will con-
tinue to be unreliable. This recommendation is applicable
to major systems and aviation support equipment. The use of
draft RFPs is one means of assuring that the contractor re-
ceives adequate information. A draft RFP provides the op-
portunity for contractors to raise questions, point out errors
and to identify what supporting information is needed.
The use of draft RFPs should be increased . Draft RFPs
may be used to identify cost drivers, noncost-ef fective con-
tract requirements and any changes that will improve system
performance or reduce the total cost of ownership. Draft
RFPs are currently underutilizied and their use should be
increased. The use of draft RFPs is encouraged by DoDD
4105.62, Selection of Contractual Sources for Major Defense
Systems.
Life-cycle cost estimates provided by the contractor
must be utilized . An analysis of contractor provided inputs
can lead to the refinement of cost models being used by both
the Navy and industry. Realistic estimates provided by the
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contractor may be used to support budget request and to jus-
tify the requirement for additional up-front funding to sup-
port design trade-off studies.
The Navy must mandate life-cycle cost goals and thres-
holds as opposed to the parameters currently required by
DoDD 4245. 3 , Design-to-Cost . As defined in current Direc-
tives a goal is a firm cost or value which should be attained,
whereas a parameter is only a measurable value to be used as
design considerations and management objectives for subsequent
life-cycle phases. Assigning goals, vice parameters, gives
ownership costs added visibility. This is brought about by
the fact that goals must be included in the Secretary of De-
fense Decision Memorandum which is submitted to the Secretary
of Defense for approval.
A lessons learned package should be centrally maintained
for all life-cycle cost management programs undertaken for
major systems . While conducting this research it was pointed
out that each time a life-cycle cost management effort was
implemented the wheel had to be reinvented. Cost management
efforts and LCC models used had not been documented nor, with
the exception of one program, were the lessons learned re-
corded. By requiring that a life-cycle cost lessons learned
package be maintained for each major program the corporate
knowledge gained through experience will not be lost. This
package could reduce the number of problems encountered on
future programs and help in improving the Government '
s
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overall capability to accurately estimate and manage cost
Such a package would also minimize the adverse effects to
a constant changeover in personnel.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Research conducted for this report has provided the
basis for further study and action in the following areas
* An examination of the feasibility of incorporating
operating and support costs for aviation support
equipment into the VAMOSC system.
* A cost-benefit analysis to determine the threshold
below which it would not be feasilbe to conduct a
life-cycle cost analysis.
* The development of a source selection guide to be
applicable to all types of support equipment as
opposed to just ATE.
* A case study of a program to determine how life-
cycle cost principles were applied and their ef-
fectiveness. Two programs which could be evaluated




ASE Aviation Support Equipment
ATE Automatic Test Equipment
BFM Business Financial Manager
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group
CASS Consolidated Automated Support System
CEBS Cost Element Breakdown Structure
CER Cost Estimating Relationship
CPAF Cost-Plus-Award-Fee
CPIF Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee
CSE Common Support Equipment
DCP Decision Coordinating Paper
DEMVAL Demonstration and Validation
DOD Department Of Defense
DODD Department Of Defense Directive
DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
DSMC Defense Systems Management College
DTC Design-To-Cost
DTLCC Design-To-Life-Cycle Cost
DTUPC Design-To-Unit Production Cost
FPIF Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee
FSD Full-Scale Development
GAO General Accounting Office
GSE General Support Equipment





























Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
Justification for Major Systems New Starts
Life-Cycle Cost
Logistics Element Manager
Life Impact Cost Analysis
Level of Repair Analysis
Mean Time Between Failure
Naval Air Engineering Center
Naval Air Rework Facility
Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C
Operation and Maintenance
Operating and Support
Office of Management and Budget
Operational Evaluation
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Operational Test and Evaluation
Program Manager







Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
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SE Support Equipment
SEAM Support Equipment Acquisition Manager
SEM Standard Electronic Module
SERD Support Equipment Recommendation Data
SESA Support Equipment Selection Analysis
SOW Statement Of Work
SPM-SE Special Program Manager-Support Equipment
T&E Test and Evaluation
TAAF Test Analyze And Fix
TPS Test Program Set
UPC Unit-Production Cost
VAMOSC Visibility And Management of Operation and
Support Cost
VE Value Engineering
VECP Value Engineering Change Proposal
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